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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION 
THE MEDIATING EFFECT OF INNOVATION ON THE RELATIONSHIP 
BETWEEN CORPORATE REPUTATION AND PERFORMANCE IN U.S. FIRMS 
by 
Marcelo J. Alvarado-Vargas 
Florida International University, 2013 
Miami, Florida 
Professor William Newburry, Major Professor 
In recent years, corporate reputation has gained the attention of many scholars in 
the strategic management and related fields. There is a general consensus that higher 
corporate reputation is positively related to firm success or performance. However, the 
link is not always straightforward; as a result, it calls for researchers to dedicate their 
efforts to investigate the causes and effects of firm reputation and how it is related to 
performance. In this doctoral dissertation, innovation is suggested as a mediating variable 
in this relationship. Innovation is a critical factor for firm success and survival. Highly 
reputed firms are in a more advantageous position to attract critical resources for 
innovation such as human and financial capital. These firms face constant pressure from 
external stakeholders, e.g. the general public, or customers, to achieve and remain at high 
levels of innovativeness. As a result, firms are in constant search, internally or externally, 
for new technologies expanding their knowledge base. Consequently, these firms engage 
in firms acquisitions. In the dissertation, the author assesses the effects of domestic 
versus international acquisitions as well as related versus unrelated acquisitions on the 
level of innovativeness and performance. 
vi 
Building upon an established measure of firm-level degree of internationalization 
(DOI), the dissertation proposes a more detailed and enhanced measure for the firm’s 
DOI. It is modeled as an interaction effect between corporate reputation and resources for 
innovation. More specifically, firms with higher levels of internationalization will have 
access to resources for innovation, i.e. human and financial capital, at a global scale. 
Additionally, the distance between firms and higher education institutions, i.e. 
universities, is considered as another interaction effect for the human capital attraction. 
The dissertation is built on two theoretical frameworks, the resource-based view 
of the firm and institutional theory. It studies 211 U.S. firms using a longitudinal panel 
data structure from 2006 to 2012. It utilizes a linear dynamic panel data estimation 
methodology for its hypotheses analyses. Results confirm the hypotheses proposed in the 
study. 
  
vii 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
CHAPTER           PAGE 
CHAPTER I ........................................................................................................................ 1 
INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................... 1 
 
CHAPTER II ....................................................................................................................... 5 
LITERATURE REVIEW ................................................................................................ 5 
RESOURCE-BASED VIEW .......................................................................................... 5 
INSTITUTIONAL THEORY .......................................................................................... 7 
INTERNATIONALIZATION THEORY AND DEGREE OF 
INTERNATIONALIZATION....................................................................................... 12 
FIRM REPUTATION ................................................................................................... 16 
INNOVATION .............................................................................................................. 21 
 
CHAPTER III ................................................................................................................... 29 
THEORY DEVELOPMENT AND HYPOTHESES .................................................... 29 
 
CHAPTER IV ................................................................................................................... 42 
SAMPLE, VARIABLES AND METHODOLOGY ..................................................... 42 
SAMPLE ....................................................................................................................... 42 
VARIABLES ................................................................................................................. 46 
Dependent Variable .................................................................................................... 47 
Independent Variables ................................................................................................ 47 
Control Variables ....................................................................................................... 56 
METHODOLOGY ........................................................................................................ 57 
 
CHAPTER V .................................................................................................................... 61 
RESULTS ...................................................................................................................... 61 
Testing hypothesis 1. .................................................................................................. 68 
Testing hypothesis 2. .................................................................................................. 71 
Testing hypothesis 3. .................................................................................................. 73 
Testing hypothesis 4. .................................................................................................. 75 
Testing hypothesis 5. .................................................................................................. 77 
Testing hypothesis 6. .................................................................................................. 79 
Testing hypothesis 7. .................................................................................................. 80 
Testing hypothesis 8. .................................................................................................. 82 
Testing hypothesis 9. .................................................................................................. 84 
Testing hypothesis 10. ................................................................................................ 87 
Testing hypothesis 11. ................................................................................................ 88 
Testing hypothesis 12. ................................................................................................ 91 
 
CHAPTER VI ................................................................................................................... 93 
DISCUSSION ................................................................................................................ 93 
viii 
 
CHAPTER VII .................................................................................................................. 98 
CONCLUSIONS, LIMITATIONS, FUTURE RESEARCH, AND RELEVANCE FOR 
PRACTITIONERS ........................................................................................................ 98 
 
REFERENCES ............................................................................................................... 102 
 
VITA ............................................................................................................................... 114 
 
  
ix 
LIST OF TABLES 
TABLE           PAGE 
Table 1. Different Types of Resources. .............................................................................. 5 
Table 2. Distribution of firms per SIC division. ............................................................... 44 
Table 3. Firms with similar geographical location. .......................................................... 44 
Table 4. List of selected variables and their roles in the dissertation ............................... 46 
Table 5. Corporate reputation per year. ............................................................................ 48 
Table 6. Descriptive statistics of the overall rank per year. .............................................. 49 
Table 7. Number of firms per year per rank-industry by Fortune classification .............. 49 
Table 8. Summary of firms per industry division per year by SIC classification ............. 50 
Table 9. Descriptive statistics of DOIs and correlation matrix. ........................................ 51 
Table 10. Summary of distances to universities. .............................................................. 52 
Table 11. Descriptive statistics of the number of employees per year. ............................ 52 
Table 12. Descriptive statistics of short- and long-term debt per year. ............................ 53 
Table 13. Descriptive statistics for knowledge/technology access ................................... 54 
Table 14. Descriptive statistics for innovation capabilities. ............................................. 55 
Table 15. Descriptive statistics for 2006........................................................................... 61 
Table 16. Descriptive statistics for 2012........................................................................... 62 
Table 17. Correlation matrix for the main variables in 2006. ........................................... 66 
Table 18. Correlation matrix for the main variables in 2012. ........................................... 67 
  
x 
LIST OF FIGURES 
FIGURE           PAGE 
Figure 1. Process of institutionalization.............................................................................. 8 
Figure 2. Breadth and depth of international operations................................................... 16 
Figure 3. Mechanisms to pursue technological change. ................................................... 28 
Figure 4. Conceptual model .............................................................................................. 30 
Figure 5. Firms with similar geographical location in the US .......................................... 45 
Figure 6. Lags for the linear dynamic panel data methodology ....................................... 58 
Figure 7. Structure of a basic mediating effect. ................................................................ 59 
Figure 8. Box plot for reputation scores per year. ............................................................ 64 
Figure 9. Box plot for degree of internationalization (FSTS) per year. ............................ 64 
Figure 10. Box plot for sales growth per year. ................................................................. 65 
Figure 11. Results for hypothesis 1. ................................................................................. 69 
Figure 12. Results for hypothesis 2. ................................................................................. 71 
Figure 13. Results for hypothesis 3. ................................................................................. 74 
Figure 14. Results for hypothesis 4. ................................................................................. 75 
Figure 15. Results for hypothesis 5. ................................................................................. 78 
Figure 16. Results for hypothesis 6. ................................................................................. 80 
Figure 17. Results for hypothesis 7. ................................................................................. 81 
Figure 18. Results for hypothesis 8. ................................................................................. 83 
Figure 19. Results for 2 interaction effects. ...................................................................... 84 
Figure 20. Results for hypothesis 9. ................................................................................. 85 
Figure 21. Results for hypothesis 9 with mediating effect. .............................................. 87 
xi 
Figure 22. Results for hypothesis 10 ................................................................................ 88 
Figure 23. Results for hypothesis 11 ................................................................................ 89 
Figure 24. Results for hypothesis 11 with mediating effect. ............................................ 90 
Figure 25. Results for hypothesis 12. ............................................................................... 91 
 
 
1 
CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
In recent years, firm reputation has gained the attention of many scholars (e.g. 
Berens and van Riel, 2004; Deephouse, 2000; Deephouse and Carter, 2005; Deephouse, 
Li and Newburry, 2009; Fombrun and Shanley, 1990; Gardberg, 2006); it refers to the 
perceptions that different stakeholders have about a firm (Rindova, Williamson, Petkova 
and Sever, 2005). Firm reputation has been regarded as an intangible asset or resource, 
which can be valuable, rare, inimitable, and non-substitutable (Barney, 1991) for the 
firm. In line with the Resource-Based View (RBV), competitive advantages can be 
developed with resources with those characteristics. Other scholars regard firm reputation 
as a source of profits (Hall, 1992; Rindova et al., 2005) and value creation (Roberts and 
Dowling, 2002). Highly reputed firms can take advantage of their reputations and charge 
extra premiums for their products and/or services because they are perceived as better 
ones in the market (Klein and Leffler, 1981; Rindova et al., 2005). There is a general 
consensus among scholars and practitioners that a good firm reputation is positively 
related to firm success (Berens and van Riel, 2004; Brown, 1998; Fombrun, 1996; 
Newburry, 2010). However, the link is not always straightforward. Also, it is important to 
note that building a positive firm reputation is a slow cumulative process, but it takes 
only a few firm accidents, or negative actions to damage it, or to significantly decrease it; 
for example, the recall of Toyota’s cars in 2009-2010, the BP deepwater oil spill in 2010, 
or the recall of cars by Toyota, Honda, and Nissan in 2013. Therefore, firm reputation 
needs to be central to corporate strategy research. 
2 
As mentioned previously, the linkage between firm reputation and performance is 
not clear and straightforward; as a result, it calls for scholars to dedicate their efforts to 
investigate the causes and effects of firm reputation and how it is related to performance. 
For this doctoral dissertation, innovation is suggested as a mediating variable between 
firm reputation and performance. According to Schumpeter (1942; 2008), the strategic 
stimulus to economic development is innovation; firms that do not innovate may have a 
darker future compared to those firms that have innovation as part of their strategic 
competencies. Therefore, innovation is a critical factor for firm success or performance. 
There are many determinants for innovation; for example, firm size, market structure, 
profitability, and firm growth (Bhattacharya and Bloch, 2004); however, in this doctoral 
dissertation, the role of corporate reputation as a determinant of innovation will be 
explored, along with its subsequent impact on firm performance. Previous studies have 
addressed the linkages separately; in other words, the relationship between corporate 
reputation and performance, or the relationship between innovation and performance; 
however, there is no study attempting the linkage between these two research streams. 
This dissertation’s main objective is to contribute and fill this gap; thus, the main 
contribution of this doctoral dissertation is to study a model in which both relationships 
are considered together through a mediation relationship. 
In addition, the dissertation will analyze the isolated mechanisms which facilitate 
the increment of firm innovation capability derived from a high firm reputation. More 
specifically, critical resources for innovation such as human capital, financial capital, and 
access to knowledge and new technologies are increased by higher firm reputation. These 
resources are, then, antecedents for an increment of firm innovation capability. 
3 
The dissertation attempts to contribute to the strategic management field, but also 
to the international business literature by proposing a new measure for the firm degree of 
internationalization (DOI). The proposed DOI includes the breadth and depth of the 
firm’s international operations as experts in the field called for researchers to contribute 
to the topic (Thomas and Eden, 2004; Kafouros, Buckley and Clegg, 2012). This 
proposed DOI measure is utilized as an interaction variable in the reputation-innovation 
relationship; more specifically, the attraction of critical resources for innovation, i.e. 
human and financial capital, and knowledge, is stronger for firms with higher levels of 
internationalization as they are able to leverage the attraction of such resources from 
global sources. Results confirm the existence of the interaction effects. 
The dissertation also studies the influence of geographical proximity to higher 
education institutions, i.e. universities. The geographical proximity to top ranked 
universities is considered to have an interaction effect on the attraction of human capital 
for innovation. 
The dissertation dataset structure is longitudinal panel data for 211 US firms from 
2006 to 2012. Thus, all the hypotheses testing were estimated by utilizing the Arellano-
Bond (Arellano and Bond, 1991) dynamic linear panel data methodology which is an 
appropriate methodology for longitudinal panel datasets with several panels (firms) and 
few periods of time. 
The rest of the dissertation is structured in six chapters. In Chapter II, relevant 
theories to the dissertation are outlined. Chapter III elucidates the theory development 
and hypotheses formulations for the dissertation. Next, chapter IV explains the 
methodology, sample and variables used in the dissertation. Chapter V provides results 
4 
obtained from estimating different models. Finally, chapters VI and VII provide insights 
for discussion, conclusions, limitations, future research and relevance for practitioners. 
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CHAPTER II 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
RESOURCE-BASED VIEW 
One of the theoretical frameworks for this dissertation is the Resource-Based 
View (RBV) of the firm (Barney, 1991; Rumelt, 1984; Wernelfelt, 1984). This theory 
states that firms are capable of creating competitive advantages in the marketplace from 
their internal resources (e.g., financial capital, physical capital, human capital, and 
organizational capital). Some examples of these resources are tangible and intangible 
assets, capabilities, knowledge, competencies, organizational processes, firm attributes, 
information, etc. See table 1 below to review some examples in the literature about 
different types of resources. 
Table 1. Different Types of Resources. 
Article Resource Type 
Barney, 1991 
 Physical: plant and equipment, technology 
 Organizational: information systems, 
accounting systems. 
 Human: skills, training, experience. 
Cuervo-Cazurra, 
Maloney, and 
Manrakhan, 2007 
 Advantageous: if generates rents for the 
firm. 
 Disadvantageous: core rigidities 
 Complementary: provides neither 
advantages nor disadvantages for the firm. 
Grant, 1991 
 Financial: free cash flow, ability to obtain 
financial resources. 
 Technological: know-how, patents. 
 Intangible: brand, reputation. 
Wernerfelt, 1984 
 Tangible: financial assets, production 
assets. 
 Intangible: networks, know-how, 
reputation, patents, organizational culture. 
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The effective and efficient management of these resources by the firm provides a 
competitive advantage over a firm's competitors (Barney, 1991) and firm growth 
(Penrose, 1959). 
In her book, Penrose’s objective was to understand the organizational process 
through which firms achieve growth and the limitations of it. She argued that firms 
should be analyzed first as an administrative framework that links and coordinates 
different interactions between people and second that firms need to be analyzed as a 
bundle of productive resources. The nature of the resources and their management is 
heterogeneous; in other words, they vary significantly from one firm to another. Firms 
are fundamentally heterogeneous even if they are in the same industry; as a result, we 
find firms with different characteristics and competitive advantages due to resource 
heterogeneity, which is one of the two assumptions for RBV. The other assumption is 
resource immobility, which means that some resources are expensive to copy, scarce, or 
not for sale. Altogether, if resources meet the assumptions, they are potential sources of 
competitive advantage. 
Barney (1991) suggests a framework called VRIO to identify resources which are 
potential sources of competitive advantage. This framework is structured in questions 
about the firms’ business activities: the question of value, the question of rarity, the 
question of imitability, and the question of organization. In the first question, firms need 
to ask whether the resource being examined enables the firm to respond to environmental 
threats or opportunities; in the second, they need to know how many other firms may 
have access or already possess the same resource. In the question related to imitability, 
firms need to know whether firms without the resource under examination face a cost 
7 
disadvantage in obtaining it compared to firms that already possess it. In other words, 
they need to know if firms without the resource can obtain it easily and cheaply. Finally, 
the firm needs to assess the question of whether the current organizational schema allows 
it to exploit the full competitive potential of the resource under examination. Research 
suggests that companies possessing valuable, rare, inimitable, and non-substitutable 
resources are more likely to generate a sustainable competitive advantage (Amit and 
Schoemaker, 1993; Barney, 1991; Grant, 1991; Peteraf, 1993; Wernerfelt, 1984). 
In this dissertation, corporate reputation is considered an intangible asset (or 
resource) which provides sustainable competitive advantage to firms (Rindova, Yeow, 
Martins and Faraj, 2012). In other words, it is valuable, rare, cannot be easily imitated, 
and it is non-transferable or non-substitutable because the reputation for one company 
remains with it. In addition, innovation capability is also considered a source for 
competitive advantage in firms. In fact, innovation capability occupies a central role in 
this research study because the study analyzes the mediating effect of innovation 
(capability) on the relationship between corporate reputation and performance. 
 
INSTITUTIONAL THEORY 
The other theoretical framework used for this dissertation is Institutional Theory. 
This theory focuses on aspects of social structure considering the processes by which 
structures, schemes, rules, norms, and routines become guidelines for social behavior 
(Scott, 2004). The creation, diffusion, adoption, and adaptation of these elements are 
explained in different components of institutional theory. For instance, Scott (1994) 
indicates that organizations, in order to survive, need to conform to the rules and norms 
8 
placed in the environment (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Meyer and Rowan, 1977) 
because institutional isomorphism will provide organizational legitimacy to the firm 
(Dacin, 1997; Deephouse, 1996; Suchman, 1995). It is common for MNCs to face diverse 
institutional environments as they expand globally. Pressures in host and home 
institutional environments exert fundamental influences on firms’ competitive strategies 
(Porter, 1990) and practices; e.g., liability of foreignness (Zaheer, 1995). 
Institutional theorists claim that the institutional environment, more than market 
pressures, can influence the development of formal structures in an organization. For 
example, new and innovative structures which improve the adopting organizations’ 
technical efficiency are legitimized in the environment. Ultimately, these formal 
structures achieve a high level of legitimatization (sedimentation) where failure to adopt 
them is considered as irrational or negligent. At this point, other firms need to adopt these 
structures even if they do not improve their efficiencies, see figure 1 from (Tolbert and 
Zucker, 1996). 
Figure 1. Process of institutionalization. 
 
Source: Tolbert and Zucker (1996) 
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Meyer and Rowan (1977) argue that these formal institutional structures, or 
“institutional myths”, are accepted ceremoniously by the firm in order to gain or maintain 
legitimacy in the environment which is extremely important to ensure survival. DiMaggio 
and Powell (1983) conclude that the effect of institutional pressure is to homogenize 
organizational structures in an institutional environment. Firms will adopt organizational 
structures by three types of pressures (three pillars of institutions): coercive (e.g., rules, 
laws, sanctions), normative (e.g., certification, accreditation), and mimetic (e.g., 
prevalence, isomorphism) (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Scott, 1994). They added that 
the speed of institutional isomorphism is higher when firms are highly dependent on the 
institutional environment, rely extensively on professionals, and exist under high 
uncertainty. 
Organizations need legitimacy and accountability within a society, but the 
problem attached to it is structural inertia (Hannan and Freeman, 1984; Nelson and 
Winter, 1982). Reliable performance requires that an organization continually reproduce 
its structure. Reproducibility is possible to achieve with routines (by institutionalization), 
but routines lead to standardization which leads to structural inertia. On the other hand, 
organizations that implement changes very often may produce very little inertia; 
however, they may have few chances for survival because they do not have routines in 
place. When a new organization is created, it has lower levels of reproducibility than the 
incumbents (older organizations). As a result, new organizations can adapt to 
environments easily or at least easier than highly-routinized organizations (Christensen, 
1997; Alvarado-Vargas, 2008). These new entrant firms have high probability of failure 
10 
in early stages of their life cycle. But, the failure rate declines as the organizations gets 
older. 
Inertia can be explained as the resistance to environmental changes (Hannan and 
Freeman, 1984). In that study, the authors argued that inertia is a consequence of 
selection; in other words, organizations build organizational inertia because they do 
things right and customers (environment) approves their procedures and the organization 
continues to carry out activities in the same way. Thus, organizational inertia leading to 
routines and vice versa is evident. For the authors, organizational inertia is linked 
primarily to firm size and age; i.e. bigger and older firms have more organizational 
inertia. For some scholars, firm size and age are important characteristics for predicting 
success in organizations (Schumpeter, 1942). However, organizational inertia and 
routines may also be negative for an organization. If the environment is changing 
constantly, for example, in terms of technological advances, organizational inertia is 
disadvantageous (negative) for the firm because it will not be able to adapt to the new 
environment easily. Inertia is stronger at the core level of the organization and peripheral 
activities in the organization face less inertia (Hannan and Freeman, 1984). 
Routines and organizational inertia are interrelated. Nelson and Winter (1982) 
investigated that individual skills and organizational capabilities may end up in 
organizational routines. These routines are the know-how for the firm and what in 
resource based view is called organizational capabilities. The main factor for 
organizational routines is repetition. Organizations create routines when the activity is 
repetitive; i.e. they perform the same activity constantly. In the case that knowledge is 
tacit, for example, routines are the best alternative to transfer that knowledge through the 
11 
organization network. Tacit knowledge is knowledge that is very difficult and 
challenging to codify and, therefore, to transfer among units or individuals. In the case of 
an acquisition and/or joint venture, routines may be an important factor for success. If 
routines in specific organizations are strong, then the success rate would decrease when 
merging or acquiring organizations. 
In the lines of institutional theory, other studies reflect a very similar explanatory 
logic. Pfeffer and Salancik’s (1978) resource dependence theory is one of them. This 
theory explains how external resources to the firm and its dependence on them affect the 
behavior of the organization in terms of divisional structure, recruitment, production 
strategies, external links, and contract structure, among the most salient. This theory 
proposes that organizations without essential resources will be forced to establish 
relationships with other firms in order to obtain access to such resources, creating strong 
dependence. As a result, organizations attempt to adjust and minimize their dependence 
relationships with other firms. In this perspective, firms are observed as coalitions 
alerting their structure and patterns of behaviors in order to acquire and maintain needed 
resources. This theory has some assumptions. First, organizations are assumed to have 
internal and external coalitions resulting from social exchanges. Second, the environment 
is assumed to contain scarce, but valuable resources for organizational survival. The 
environment is responsible for posing the problem of organizations facing uncertainty in 
resource acquisition. Third, organizations are assumed to have two related objectives: 
acquiring control over needed resources, and minimizing their dependence on other 
firms. One of the options that Pfeffer and Salancik propose to minimize environmental 
dependences is vertical integration (acquisitions) (Hillman, Withers, and Collins, 2009; 
12 
Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). In this dissertation, acquisitions are assessed as an important 
mechanism for firms to get access to knowledge and new technology trends in the 
environment. 
 
INTERNATIONALIZATION THEORY AND DEGREE OF 
INTERNATIONALIZATION 
For many decades, the literature in international business has studied the impact 
of the internationalization process and the degree of internationalization on the firm’s 
performance reaching mixed results. For example, some scholars have argued that there 
is not a perceivable relationship between the degree of internationalization of a 
multinational firm and its performance (Haar, 1989; Rugman, 1983); on the other hand, 
other scholars have encountered a positive linear relationship (Buhner, 1987; Gomes and 
Ramaswamy, 1999; Grant, 1987; Grant, Jammine, and Thomas, 1988), an inverted U-
shape relationship (Geringer and Hebert, 1989; Hitt, Hoskisson, and Kim, 1997), a U-
shape relationship (Ruigrok and Wagner, 2003), and even a sigmoid-curve (3-stage) 
relationship (Contractor, Kundu and Hsu, 2003; Lu and Beamish, 2001). 
Hennart (2007) and Verbeke and Li (2009) argue that there is a lack of theoretical 
rationale in order to support a general and well established multinationality-performance 
(M-P) relationship. This gap presents an important opportunity for proposing new 
theories for the M-P relationship and measures for the degree of internationalization 
(Kirca et al., 2011). These mixed results convey that more attention should be paid to 
measures of internationalization. 
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As previously stated, the internationalization process has been widely studied 
during the last few decades in the field of international business. We have, for example, 
the Uppsala model which explains the different stages of the firm’s internationalization 
process and shows that the internationalization process is incremental (Johanson and 
Vahlne, 1977). In other words, after firms start their international expansion, their 
subsequent investments in those foreign markets increase. For example, a firm may 
initially sell its products or services domestically. As its tangible and/or intangible 
resources grow and the domestic market reaches the upper limit, the firm looks for 
alternative markets to expand internationally. It may start exporting to foreign markets 
through an agent. Once the demand in the foreign market is significant, the firm may 
consider opening an office in the host country to internalize those operations. Later, the 
firm may consider starting production abroad in order to manage market imperfections, 
achieve economies of scale, or enjoy cost advantages provided by the host economy 
(Johanson and Vahlne, 1977). This stage represents the highest commitment from the 
firm with the foreign market. 
Traditionally, international business scholars relied on the classic and neo-classic 
theories of international trade to explain the distribution for the foreign direct investment 
(FDI) (Nachum, 2000). It was during the decades of the late 1970s and early 1980s when 
John Dunning developed his eclectic paradigm (O-L-I) in the international business field. 
Since then, this theory has been vastly referenced when developing research in IB. 
Dunning’s work is used to explain ‘why’ some MNCs expand internationally by creating 
subsidiaries in host countries, ‘where’ to locate them, and ‘how’ to enter new markets 
(entry mode choice) (Dunning, 1980, 1988). When a MNC decides to expand 
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internationally, it can use the asset-exploitation or the asset-seeking strategy (Makino, 
Lau, and Yeh, 2002). For the former, the literature assumes that the MNC possesses 
certain resources (proprietary resources or skills) which can provide some monopolistic 
advantages in the foreign environment (Hymer, 1976). As a result, the company would go 
abroad to generate rents by using the mentioned resources. For the second strategy, 
literature explains that MNCs go abroad to develop new firm specific advantages or 
acquire necessary strategic assets, e.g., knowledge or new technologies, in foreign 
markets (Makino et al., 2002). 
The importance of the internationalization measure was previously noted. As a 
result, the degree of internationalization (DOI) of the firm gained much attention by 
scholars in the mid 1990s (Ramaswamy, Kroeck, and Renforth, 1996; Riahi-Belkaoui, 
1998; Sullivan, 1994, 1996). For example, Riahi-Belkaoui (1998), Grant (1987), 
Geringer, Beamish and daCosta (1989), and Daniels and Bracker (1989) measured the 
firm’s degree of internationalization as the foreign sales as a percentage of total sales 
(FSTS). Others used export sales as a percentage of total sales (ESTS) (Sullivan and 
Bauerschmidt, 1989), foreign profits as a percentage of total profits (FPTP) (Eppink and 
van Rhijn, 1988), foreign assets as a percentage of total assets (FATA) (Daniels and 
Bracker, 1989), and overseas subsidiaries as a percentage of total subsidiaries (OSTS) 
(Stopford and Wells, 1972; Vernon, 1971). At a first glance, these DOI measures seem 
very simplistic, but very practical at the same time. Nevertheless, they have some flaws 
in their calculations which have been noted and criticized by researchers. 
I use an example to pinpoint the limitations of those measures. In the case of 
FSTS, we assume there are two MNCs with international operations. The first sells $1 
15 
million in France, $1 million in Brazil, $1 million in Japan, and $10 million in the US. 
The DOI calculation (FSTS) for this company is 3/13. The second company sells $3 
million in Canada and $10 million in the US. The DOI calculation is also 3/13. However, 
the first company seemed more international, ex-ante. The other DOI measures provide 
similar flaws in their calculations. The number of countries in which the MNC operates 
should have some consideration on the DOI calculation to make it more accurate. In this 
doctoral dissertation, I propose a new DOI measure: 
DOIi = Ci * OSTSi * FSTSi  Equation (1) 
Where: 
DOIi is the degree of internationalization for the ith MNC; Ci is the total number 
of countries in which the ith MNC operates (including the home country); OSTSi is the 
number of foreign subsidiaries (affiliates) as a percentage of the total number of 
subsidiaries (affiliates) in the ith MNC, and FSTSi is the foreign sales as a percentage of 
total sales in the ith MNC. 
The proposed DOI measure assesses the call for many researchers to establish an 
internationalization measure which takes into account the breadth and depth of 
international operations (Thomas and Eden, 2004). Breadth of international operations is 
accounted by the OSTS ratio and the number of countries in which the MNC operates; 
both provide information about the percentage of foreign subsidiaries (affiliates) in the 
MNC network and how many countries are involved in the process. It can be thought as 
the number of rays emanating from a center point (nucleus), see figure 2 for a pictorial 
representation. In the pictorial example, the firm would have international operations in 
six countries (5 nodes plus the domestic market), and 27 foreign subsidiaries and 45 
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domestic affiliates. Depth of international operations is accounted by the FSTS ratio. It 
provides information about the intensity of international operations in relationship to the 
entire operation basis. In terms of the nucleus analogy, depth would indicate the size of 
the nodes at the end of the rays emanating from the center (figure 2). 
Figure 2. Breadth and depth of international operations 
 
 
FIRM REPUTATION 
In recent decades, firm reputation has received attention from management 
researchers and practitioners. The interest in corporate reputation is found in recent 
publications in different outlets such as the Financial Times, Fortune Magazine, and US 
News and World Report. These magazines published reputation scores for firms in 
different industries for several years. It has been noted before that there is almost a 
consensus about the positive effects of high firm reputation (Roberts and Dowling, 2002; 
Sabate and Puente, 2003). High levels of reputation give a firm distinct advantages such 
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as its product and stocks are more appealing to customers and investors, more people 
want to join the firm (job seekers), generate more loyalty and motivation among its 
employees, better relationships with suppliers, and their risks with crises are fewer 
(Fombrun, 1996; Newburry, 2010). A highly reputed firm is perceived as “esteemed, 
worthy, and meritorious” according to Dollinger, Golden and Saxton (1997). Firm 
reputation is a valuable resource for the firm due to its “stickiness” (Fombrun, 1996; 
Fombrun and van Riel, 2004; Roberts and Dowling, 2002). 
According to the Resource-Based View literature, firm reputation is considered a 
strategic factor which allows the firm to generate above-average rents (Barney, 1986). 
High firm reputation may provide competitive advantages for the firm given its VRIO 
(valuable, rare, inimitable, and non-substitutable) nature (Barney, 1991; Hall, 1992). Firm 
reputation has been also regarded as a source of value creation (Roberts and Dowling, 
2002). On a different perspective, academicians in the marketing area have shed some 
light about the notion that high firm reputation is a signal of product quality and enables 
firms to charge higher prices for their services or products (Klein and Leffler, 1981). 
Using the Human Resource (HR) perspective, high firm reputation influences the 
employees’ morale and productivity in a positive way (Garbett, 1988). High firm 
reputation minimizes transaction costs in terms of strategic alliances, joint ventures, or 
partnerships (Dollinger, Golden, and Saxton, 1997) because of trust vested in highly 
reputed firms. The above mentioned theoretical approaches, in their respective studies, 
consider firm reputation as a predictor for firm performance. The same structure is 
considered in this doctoral dissertation; however, the inclusion of firm innovation as a 
mediating factor is the main contribution. 
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Firm reputation has a multidimensional nature. By examining its sources, we may 
find economic and non-economic constituents. For example, the work of Fombrun and 
Shanley (1990) and Garbett (1988) show that firm size is linked directly to firm 
reputation; stating that bigger firms possess higher firm reputation. Other studies 
proposed that accounting performance and the firm’s risk profile are contributors to firm 
reputation (Roberts and Dowling, 2002). Media exposure and advertising have been 
pinpointed to play an important role in contributing to firm reputation (Bromley, 1993; 
Fombrun and Shanley, 1990; Garbett, 1988). Recently, corporate social responsibility and 
firm community involvement have been found to be good contributors for firm reputation 
(Sabate and Puente, 2003). 
In addition to these studies, the effect of corporate strategy on firm reputation has 
been studied by other scholars. A firm’s strategy provides information about the direction 
the firm intends to pursue; related stakeholders are then capable of evaluating those 
strategies and associate them to the firm reputation. For example, Williams, Schnake and 
Fredenberger (2005) proposed that firms pursuing a single business strategy obtain higher 
firm reputation compared to firms pursuing strategies with related or unrelated 
diversification. The explanation to this rationale is that firms pursuing a single business 
strategy provide a less ambiguous and clearer and more concise image in comparison to 
those firms with a diversification strategy. Stakeholders would be able to define the 
firm’s business environment more clearly for firms following the single business 
strategy; this can be reflected in a higher firm reputation. Firms pursuing an unrelated 
diversification strategy might be perceived negatively by the stakeholders, affecting its 
reputation in the negative direction. 
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Borrowing concepts from neo-institutional theory, organizations seek legitimacy 
in the environment they operate. Firms respond to different isomorphic pressures from 
the external environment (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Scott, 
2007). Firm reputation is, therefore, a social construct and it depends on the capacity that 
the firm conforms to the cultural values, standards, and norms that prevail in a certain 
society or environment. As organizations employ institutionalized or ‘accepted’ 
procedures to achieve legitimacy, stakeholders compare and evaluate firms accordingly. 
Negative firm reputation may be granted to those companies which do not follow 
standard procedures used in the environment. As a result, firms wanting to secure a 
legitimate position in the environment need to meet and follow the standards placed in 
the environment. 
Bergh et al. (2010) advanced the explanation of the relationship between 
corporate reputation and performance using other additional theoretical frameworks. The 
authors borrowed concepts from the resource-based view (previously explained), 
transactions costs economics (TCE) (Williamson, 1975; 1981), signaling theory (Spence, 
1973), and social status research for their study. In the case of TCE, reputation has been 
characterized as a specific asset because it is particular to transacting partners 
(Williamson, 1981). Reputation can negatively influence the cost of a given transaction 
because the firm needs to identify and screen potential partners. Contrastingly, strong 
reputations may reduce incentives to act opportunistically reducing transaction costs. 
Reputation also affects the costs associated with negotiation, drafting, and enforcing 
contracts among partners. Summarizing, partners with higher reputation tend to be trusted 
more, they are not expected to act opportunistically, and contracts with them have lower 
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costs. In the case of signaling theory (Spence, 1973), the author notes that this theory has 
been used to explain how external entities react to informational attributes of the firm, in 
this case its reputation. In essence, signals need to reduce the information asymmetries 
between low and high quality firms and the costs of the signal are higher for low quality 
firms; Basdeo et al. (2006) argued that firm reputation is influenced by its market actions 
and also by the actions of its industry rivals. Finally, social status involves creating and 
perpetuating differences within a group of entities. Status hierarchies evolve 
spontaneously in social settings and are based on social characteristics which are used to 
create performance expectations for internal and external entities to the firm. For 
example, we expect Apple Inc. and Google to be very innovative firms. 
Although the antecedents and consequences of corporate reputation are important 
to study, this dissertation focuses more on the consequences, with economic outcomes the 
most prevailing. If we consider prices as the outcome variable, Benjamin and Podolny 
(1999) found that reputation for quality in winemakers was associated with higher prices. 
Or, Standifird (2001) showed that the final prices paid in eBay auctions were associated 
with the seller’s ratings. Corporate recruiter scores for applicants are influenced by the 
applicant’s school reputation (Boyd et al., 2010), or the school’s reputation influences the 
starting salaries for recent graduated MBAs (Boyd et al., 2010; Rindova et al., 2005). If 
we consider firm financial performance, Deephouse (2000) argued that the level of 
favorable media coverage about a firm influenced the firm’s return on assets. In the same 
line, Roberts and Dowling (2002) found a positive relationship between firm reputation 
and return on assets. Also, high firm reputation may give firms the benefit of doubt when 
negative information about them is available. For example, Pfarrer, Pollock and Rindova 
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(2010) found that firms with higher reputations experience smaller stock market penalties 
for negative earnings surprises. Similarly, Love and Kraatz (2009) found that firms with 
higher reputations suffered less reputation loss after a firm downsizing. 
Apart from the economic outcomes, other possible positive outcomes for the firm 
have been addressed by researchers. For instance, corporate reputation has been found to 
be related to attract more employees and customers (Turban and Cable, 2003). Jensen and 
Roy (2008) found that auditor reputation for technical expertise was an important factor 
to be selected by a given firm. In the context of mergers and acquisitions, Saxton and 
Dollinger (2004) found that a target firm’s reputation was positively related to the 
acquirer assessment for the acquisition procedure. Deephouse and Carter (2005) found 
that high reputation allows banks to deviate from normal strategic behavior without 
significant loss of reputation. Although several consequences of corporate reputation 
have been explained in this section, human capital attraction, financial capital attraction, 
and the need for knowledge and new technology access are relevant for the dissertation. 
These high reputation consequences are related to the innovation capability of the firm. 
 
INNOVATION 
Important technological changes occurred in society in the last 150 years. Our 
routines at home and work have been transformed by new products and services; 
innovation has contributed to these changes in a profound manner. Hence, it is possible to 
argue that innovation is essential to social and economic progress (Dodgson and Gann, 
2010; Schumpeter, 1942). In many industries, technological innovation is now the most 
important driver of competitive success and firms rely on products developed within the 
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past five years for almost one third of their sales and profits (Barczak, Griffin and Kahn, 
2009); hence, the importance of innovation for firms such as Johnson & Johnson and 3M. 
However, innovation is still linked to high rates of failure in organizations because of our 
relatively limited understanding of its causes and effects. In this doctoral dissertation, 
innovation will occupy a mediating position between firm reputation and performance in 
order to contribute to the literature in advancing the understanding about innovation and 
its relationships. The literature in innovation remains so fragmented with no cumulative 
results (Ariss and Deilami, 2012) that we still do not have a clear general definition; 
many scholars have defined it according to their study requirements despite many 
attempts of scholars to establish one (Cooper, 1998; Garcia and Calantone, 2002). For 
example, Knight (1967), declares that an innovation is the adoption of a change which is 
new to an organization and the environment. Becker and Whisler (1967) assert that 
innovation as the first or early use of an idea by one or a set of organizations. Tushman 
and Nadler (1986) define that innovation is the creation of any product, service, or 
process which is new to a business unit. Thompson (1965) defined innovation as the 
generation, acceptance and implementation of new ideas, processes, products, or services. 
Betz (2003) defines technological innovation as both the invention of a new technology 
and its introduction into the marketplace. In other words, innovation is invention plus 
exploitation (Roberts, 2007). According to Garcia and Calantone (2002), the excess and 
diversity of definitions for innovation in the literature has resulted in ambiguity for 
researchers to measure relative constructs. 
In this dissertation, innovation is defined as the creation of better or more 
effective and efficient products, processes, services, technologies, or ideas that are 
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accepted by different stakeholders such as customers, institutions, and the society in 
general. Many other proposed definitions for innovation gravitate alongside this 
definition as exemplified in the previous paragraph. As the definition states, innovations 
are not only found in the activities that the firms do, but also in their processes (Dodgson 
and Gann, 2010); however, innovation will be assumed to be referring to product 
innovation for the rest of this dissertation. Innovation is normally linked to improvements 
in efficiency, productivity, and quality, among the most important and notable outputs. 
Innovation is becoming more internationalized due to the effect of globalization 
and globalization of markets. As a result, potential sources of innovation are growing 
rapidly. For example, the location for innovation is changing to economies where the 
service sector is dominant. Currently, ownership and access to knowledge are more 
important and valuable than the possession of physical assets as in past decades. 
Innovation can arise from many different sources; for example, it can originate with 
individuals (inventors or users designing solutions for their own needs), research efforts 
of universities, government laboratories and incubators, or private nonprofit 
organizations. There are internal as well as external sources for innovation. Critics have 
often stated that firms are using external sources of technological innovation rather than 
investing in original in-house research. Empirical evidence shows that external sources of 
information are more likely to be complements to rather than substitutes for in-house 
research and development. Engaging in in-house R&D helps to build the firm’s 
absorptive capacity which refers to the firm’s ability to understand and use new 
information (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990). Studies have shown that intangible assets (e.g., 
organizational and network capital) may be considered as drivers for innovation (Kramer, 
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Marinelli, Iammarino and Revilla Diez, 2011). In this dissertation, corporate reputation, 
an intangible asset, is proposed as a driver for innovation. 
Innovation plays an important role for the continuing existence of organizations. 
Firms that do not innovate have a darker future in comparison to those firms in which 
innovation has a central strategic focus (Schumpeter, 1942). As a result, innovation is 
found in every organization, e.g., public institutions, not-for-profit organizations, and for-
profit firms. For Schumpeter, capitalism can only be understood as an evolutionary 
process of continuous innovation and “creative destruction”. He identified innovation as 
the critical dimension of economic change. He also argued that technological innovation 
often creates temporary monopolies, allowing abnormal profits which are faded away by 
rivals and imitators when they enter the marketplace. According to him, these temporary 
monopolies are required to provide incentives necessary for firms to develop new 
products and processes. He asserted that agents driving innovation and the economy are 
large companies because they have resources for research and development (Schumpeter, 
1942). As a result, for him, large firms are more likely to innovate than small firms. 
Much research has addressed the relationship between firm size and innovation since 
Schumpeter’s work; however, the debate is still ongoing (Antonelli and Calderini, 1999; 
Breschi, 1999; Malerba and Orsenigo, 1995). Empirical studies have reached 
contradicting results due to different innovation measures, sampling methods, and the 
size of firms included in the studies. 
An important driver for innovation or technological change is the pressure for 
innovating product that external as well as internal stakeholders place on the firm (Adner 
and Levinthal, 2001); such pressure forces firms to search for and acquire knowledge and 
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new technologies outside its boundaries. Sometimes, firms are clustered in regions or 
cities in order to facilitate and enjoy the benefit of knowledge exchange, e.g., Silicon 
Valley. Firms may want to stay close to these technological clusters to access technical 
spillovers. Technical spillovers occur when the benefits from the research activities of 
one firm spread to other firms; thus, spillovers are a positive externality in R&D efforts 
(Jaffe, 1986, 1989; Jaffe, Trajtenberg and Henderson, 1993). 
The natural evolution of technology and communication infrastructures allowed 
firms to have access to more technological knowledge within and outside the firm 
boundaries, developing a higher level of innovation (Fabrizio and Thomas, 2012). Firm 
specific resources are critical for innovation; slack in those resources has been proved to 
be disadvantageous for innovation. In other words, there is an inverted U-shape 
relationship between slack resources and innovation; too much and too little slack are 
detrimental for innovation (Nohria and Gulati, 1996). 
Innovation can be manifested, as explained before, in products or processes. The 
nature of innovation can be incremental or radical (Chesbrough and Teece, 1996; 
Henderson and Clark, 1990). Incremental innovations are easier to execute and/or 
manage; therefore, it is not surprising that most innovations are incremental 
improvements of existing products and services (Dodgson and Gann, 2010). Innovation 
means changing well established routines within the organization and the environment; as 
a result, people are uncomfortable with the changes brought by innovations. People need 
to unlearn previous routines (Nelson and Winter, 1982), and re-learn new ones causing 
some inefficiency which is more relevant in radical innovations. Therefore, 
organizational inertia (Hannan and Freeman, 1984) or structural inertia is one of the 
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reasons for innovation failures or slower innovation adoption (Alvarado-Vargas, 2008) 
because the initial pressures on keeping structures are strong. These pressures vary 
depending on the firm age, size, and structural complexity (Chandy and Tellis, 2000). 
One of the major postulations is that organizations with strong organizational inertia 
seldom succeed in making radical changes in strategy and structure in the face of 
environmental changes. Large firms commonly fail to develop radical or disruptive 
innovations partially because of the inability to unlearn obsolete mental models, risk-
averse corporate climate, innovation process mismanagement, or poor infrastructure for 
innovation (Assink, 2006; Hill and Rothaermel, 2003). Some factors which favor 
incremental innovation include environmental dynamism, age and size of the firm 
(Koberg, Detienne and Heppard, 2003); in other words, larger and older firms posses 
enough resources for successful incremental innovations, but they fail when dealing with 
radical innovations (Christensen, 1997). 
Investments in research and development are important for firm innovation; they 
enable firms to search for new ideas which may generate rents (Bresnahan, Stern and 
Trajtenberg, 1997; Teece, 1986); other studies showed the influence of mergers and 
acquisitions on innovation performance (Ahuja and Katila, 2001). Since a firm’s ability 
to profit from an innovation depends on how well the newly acquired capabilities and 
technologies build on the firm’s current capabilities (capabilities enhancing), the firm 
would be better off acquiring firms in which it is familiar; in other words, the firm will be 
better off acquiring firms in the same industry or region. Professor Roberts from MIT 
elaborates on the subject with what he terms the innovation dilemma: “[T]he further that 
any company seeks to innovate,…, the greater the likelihood that its innovation efforts 
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will fail. And yet, the less that a firm seeks to innovate, across the board, the greater the 
likelihood that the corporation itself will fail” (Roberts, 2007). To be successful with a 
new technology, a firm needs new knowledge and capabilities which reinforce the firm’s 
current competitive advantage. Since building these capabilities from scratch is very 
difficult, costly, and takes time, a firm may be better off acquiring the capabilities and 
knowledge from another firm through acquisitions (Roberts and Berry, 1986). Figure 3 
shows the mechanisms to pursue technological change (Afuah, 2003). When the new 
technology and the market served are familiar to a company (cell IV), it has two options 
for profiting from the new technology: internal development and acquisitions. 
Acquisition of a firm which has developed the technology is preferred in situations where 
the firm needs the technology quickly because internal development (in-house R&D) 
takes too much time and resources. In cell I, the new technology is familiar to the firm, 
but the market is not. In this case, the firm has three alternatives: joint venture, strategic 
alliance, or acquisitions. In a joint venture, firms form a separate legal entity; preferably, 
each firm brings to the relationship what the other firm is lacking, complementing their 
capabilities. Strategic alliances are weaker relationships compared to joint ventures or 
acquisitions. Access to the new technology or capabilities may be limited (Schilling, 
2010). Acquisitions may be a better alternative for firms not familiar with the market. 
When the technology and market are not familiar to the firm (cell II), its existing 
capabilities are likely to be “useless”. As a result, the firm may engage in educational 
acquisitions in which the firm buys another one not to keep it as a subsidiary, but for the 
sole purpose of learning from it. Finally in cell III, the technology is unfamiliar, but the 
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market is familiar to the firm. So, the firm may engage in acquisitions in order to get 
access to the technology. 
Figure 3. Mechanisms to pursue technological change. 
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Technical innovation or product innovation has been related to firm performance 
(Damanpour, Szabat and Evan, 1989; Teece, 1986); however, the measure of innovation 
is a central debate in the technology management field. It is sometimes suggested that 
innovation is very difficult to quantify and measure (Smith, 2005); however, there seems 
to be an agreement to use R&D expenditures and patents information as plausible proxies 
for measuring it (Neely, 1999); in the United States, a patent is a property right granted 
by the federal government that restrains others from producing, using, or selling the 
invention (US Patents and Trademark Office). Other research relies on measurements 
derived from surveys among companies, or primary data. 
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CHAPTER III 
THEORY DEVELOPMENT AND HYPOTHESES 
The relationship between firm reputation and performance has been previously 
studied. Scholars have reached conclusions that higher corporate reputation is positively 
related to higher firm performance (Bergh, Ketchen, Boyd and Bergh, 2010; Boyd, Bergh 
and Ketchen, 2010; Rindova, Williamson and Petkova, 2010; Roberts and Dowling, 
2002). Within the Resource-Based View framework, firm reputation may be considered 
an intangible (V-R-I-O) resource which provides a competitive advantage to the firm 
(Barney, 1991) and consequently higher firm performance. 
Since Schumpeter’s argument about a darker future of firms which do not 
innovate, scholars have studied the impact of innovation on firm success and survival 
(Schumpeter, 1942). It has been argued that firms can profit from innovation (Teece, 
1986) and innovation has been found to have a positive effect on firm performance 
(Bresnahan, Stern and Trajtenberg, 1997). In essence, firm reputation and innovation 
have been linked to firm performance independently in previous studies. However, there 
is a gap in the literature in terms of integrating these variables, providing room for this 
research. Thus, the principal objective and contribution of this doctoral dissertation is to 
test the mediating effect of innovation in the relationship between firm reputation and 
performance. 
The conceptual model is shown in the following figure. As explained previously, 
the main objective of this dissertation is to study the linkage between corporate reputation 
and performance, using innovation capability as a mediating variable. More specifically, 
firm reputation is expected to have a positive impact on the level of firm innovation 
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(innovation capability); at the same time, innovation capability is expected to be 
positively related to firm performance. The first relationship, i.e., corporate reputation 
and innovation capability, is achieved by attracting critical resources for innovation such 
as human capital, financial capital, and knowledge and technology access (acquisitions). 
Other determinants for innovation have been studied before (e.g., firm size, firm age, 
accounting performance, etc); these determinants are considered as control variables in 
this dissertation. 
Figure 4. Conceptual model 
 
 
Firms with higher reputation are in an advantageous position to attract key agents 
for innovation, i.e., human capital. As found by Newburry (2010), reputation is positively 
associated with firm supportive behaviors such as workplace attractiveness. For example, 
these firms may be considered as attractive workplaces for newly graduated engineers 
who would be in charge of projects involving new product/service development 
(innovation). Or, it can be plausible to find eager university students considering these 
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highly reputed firms as target for their internships. In addition, universities may be 
interested to create ties with these firms for internship programs and research centers. 
Firms with higher corporate reputation have a constant pressure by different stakeholders 
to have their products or services continuously improved by radical or incremental 
innovations. As a result, they need to have access to new technologies and knowledge. 
New product development projects require financial resources which can be 
accessed internally or externally. Very often in organizations, the research and 
development team obtain little support from senior management when developing a 
radical innovation (Christensen, 1997; Leifer et al, 1994). One of the main explanations 
according to Christensen is that radical innovative products target markets which are not 
well developed and/or are very small for the firm’s objectives. Therefore, senior 
management executives are reluctant to invest in those projects. In these cases, the 
research team might search for external financial resources such as private investors, or 
financial institutions which may be domestic or international. Better financial conditions 
and/or fewer guarantees may be applicable and requested to firms with higher level of 
reputation compared to those firms with lower levels. 
The third component of critical resources for innovation is access to knowledge 
and new technologies through acquisitions. When the acquisition transaction is finalized, 
the focal firm may have access to other product developments and/or technology utilized 
by the acquired firm. By having access to these resources, the focal firm would increase 
its own level of innovation capability. 
As observed in the model, firm reputation is positively related to these three 
critical resources for innovation. In simple words, the more reputation a firm has the 
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more human capital, the better access to financial resources, and the more acquisitions 
the firm will achieve. These critical resources are needed in order to increase the level of 
innovation capability in a firm. Concurrently, these resources are positively related to 
firm innovation capability. Human capital, financial resources, and acquisitions will 
increase the innovation capability of the firm. Kramer et al. (2011) studied the linkages 
between intangible assets as drivers for innovation. In the dissertation, corporate 
reputation, an intangible asset, is considered as a driver for innovation. 
In the model, two moderating effects are considered. First, a firm's degree of 
internationalization will positively moderate the relationship between firm reputation and 
the attraction of critical resources for innovation, i.e. human capital, financial capital, and 
knowledge base. For firms with a high degree of internationalization, the positive 
relationship between firm reputation and the attraction of critical resources for innovation 
will be stronger (steeper slope) than for firms with a low degree of internationalization. 
Second, universities were found to be a good source for critical resources for innovation 
(Kerr, 1963), more specifically, human capital. As a result, a firm whose headquarter is 
located closer to key higher education institutions may find it easier to attract human 
capital with certain skills such as newly graduated engineers in a certain field or 
university students considering temporal internships. Closer distance to these institutions 
will enhance the effect of the relationship between reputation and the human capital 
resource attraction. 
For the first moderating variable, a new measure for the degree of 
internationalization is proposed in this doctoral dissertation as discussed previously. For 
this dissertation, the calculation of the degree of internationalization will be composed by 
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three factors: the number of countries in which the MNC is located including the home 
country, the ratio of the number of foreign affiliates to the total number of affiliates 
(domestic and foreign), and the ratio of foreign sales to total sales. The first two factors 
combined will measure the breadth or dispersion of the MNC network; the third factor 
will measure the depth or intensity of foreign operations. 
Finally, profiting from innovation has been already analyzed in previous studies 
(Teece, 1986). Consequently, the firm innovation capability is expected to be positively 
related to firm performance. Various studies used different financial indicators to assess 
firm success or performance; some of them used return on investment (ROI), return on 
equity (ROE), return on sales (ROS), return on assets (ROA) (Deephouse, 2000), and 
sales growth (Vissa and Chacar, 2009). These financial indicators are considered 
appropriate proxies for performance measurements and they are widely used in the 
literature. As a result, they are going to be used as proxies for firm performance herein. 
As the dissertation's main contribution is the mediating effect of innovation on the 
relationship between reputation and performance, I postulate the following overarching 
hypothesis. 
 
Hypothesis 1. Firm’s innovation capability mediates the relationship between firm 
reputation and performance such that firm reputation is positively related to firm 
innovation capability and consequently positively related to firm performance. 
 
Once the mediating effect of innovation on the reputation-performance 
relationship has been addressed in H1, the three following hypotheses are concentrated 
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on the attraction of critical resources for innovation, i.e. human capital, financial capital, 
and knowledge and technology access, based on high corporate reputation scores. 
Firm reputation has a strong influence on people searching for employment 
(Cable and Graham, 2000). Organizational reputation affects workforce composition 
because of job seekers’ initial attraction to organizations with higher reputation. Thus, it 
is very important for firms to possess a high reputation to attract high quality potential 
employees; scholars have argued that firm reputation may attract more and higher caliber 
applicants (Turban and Cable, 2003). In the case of innovation, this rationale is very 
critical; in order to have higher levels of innovation, firms need to employ human 
resources capable of performing those tasks. Job seekers may have been previously 
customers of the firm; as a result, they may found themselves inclined to work for the 
firm. For a company with high reputation, consumer enthusiasm and excitement can 
arguably arise (Henard and Dacin, 2010) and converge into the desire to work for that 
firm. 
Reputation has two dimensions which are the stakeholders’ perceptions of the 
firm producing higher quality products, and organizations’ prominence in the minds of 
stakeholders, i.e. how stakeholders perceive firms (Rindova et al., 2005). This latter 
dimension is more salient for the attraction of human resources related to innovation 
because potential star employees would select and apply for jobs in firms which are 
highly recognized in the environment. Accordingly, I postulate hypothesis 2. 
 
Hypothesis 2. Firm reputation is positively related to critical resources for firm 
innovation capability, more specifically, human capital. 
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Firms are in constant pressure to obtain financial resources for growth, 
investments, and R&D operations. Firms are searching for cheap sources of debt. High 
reputation may enhance the process of finding more advantageous sources of capital for 
the firms. Some of the benefits for firms with high reputation may include lower cost of 
capital, greater availability of capital, and less required collateral or guarantees, among 
the most salient (Bornheim and Herbeck, 1998). Lenders will monitor the borrower to a 
lesser extent when the borrower’s credit worthiness and reputation are higher (Diamond, 
1991). In case of a good standing in reputation and credit worthiness, lenders may adopt a 
position of arm’s-length contract; in other words, less rigorous or less monitoring. 
Contrarily, lenders may use shorter lending periods with more strict contracts, and higher 
rates when firms have lower reputations (Rajan, 1992). In the latter situation, lenders 
possess more bargaining power compared to the firm. Consequently, I hypothesize the 
following: 
 
Hypothesis 3. Firm reputation is positively related to critical resources for firm 
innovation capability, more specifically, financial capital (e.g. short and long term 
non-equity debts). 
 
The number of acquisitions by US firms has been growing in the last decades. 
Recently, important mergers and acquisitions have been announced in the post-global 
financial crisis, e.g., the merger of American Airlines and US Airways, and a joint 
acquisition of the food conglomerate H.G Heinz by 3G and Berkshire Hathaway (Time 
magazine, February 2013). Acquisitions have become an important transaction 
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governance form in the business environment if the objective is to possess more control 
and access to new technologies and capabilities. Firm reputation has been considered an 
important intangible resource for cooperation and the attraction of firm targets for 
acquisitions (Chen and Zeng, 2004; Dollinger et al., 1997; Fombrun and Shanley, 1990; 
Saxton and Dollinger, 2004; Servaes and Zenner, 1996). Mergers and acquisitions will 
provide full access to technologies that target firms possess prior the transaction. Firms 
are in constant pressure by stakeholders to keep high levels of innovation. As a result, 
firms need to develop new technologies in order to address the stakeholders’ requests. 
Firms would face two possibilities. First, they can develop such new technologies in-
house. However, this option is costly in terms of resources and time. Second, firms may 
have access to new technologies from other organizations. This option (merger and/or 
acquisition) is quicker and less uncertain because most of the time they are proven and 
working technologies. Consequently, I postulate the following hypothesis. 
 
Hypothesis 4. Firm reputation is positively related to knowledge and new 
technologies access, more specifically, firm acquisitions. 
 
The positive effects of internationalization have been studied for many decades in 
the international business literature. These studies argued that internationalization 
represents a precondition for superior financial success (Ruigrok and Wagner, 2003); 
other benefits are economies of scale and scope (Buckley and Casson, 1976; Caves, 
1971), portfolio diversification and an improvement on the companies’ risk-return 
performance (Lessard, 1976). Other benefits associated with non-tangible measures are 
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international image/visibility and corporate branding improvement (Burt and Sparks, 
2002). In the 90s, a very dynamic debate about the measure of internationalization, or 
degree of internationalization has been initiated, e.g., Ramaswamy et al. (1996) and 
Sullivan (1994; 1996) due to the fact that diverse results were found when establishing 
the relationship between multinationality and performance. Currently, a standard DOI 
measure is not in place, which provides the opportunity to test for new alternatives for 
measuring the firm’s DOI. As previously stated, I am proposing a new DOI measure 
which will assess the breadth and depth of international operations. 
 
Hypothesis 5. A firm’s DOI moderates the relationship between firm reputation 
and human capital for innovation such that for firms with higher level of DOI, the 
relationship is stronger. 
 
Hypothesis 6. The firm’s DOI moderates the relationship between firm reputation 
and financial capital (short and long term debts) for innovation such that for firms 
with higher level of DOI, the relationship is stronger. 
 
Hypothesis 7. The firm’s DOI moderates the relationship between firm reputation 
and knowledge and new technologies access (acquisitions) for innovation such 
that for firms with higher level of DOI, the relationship is stronger. 
 
Collaborations between universities and firms to foster technical advancements 
are not new in the literature (Rosenberg and Nelson, 1994). In fact, it is commonly 
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accepted that universities are critical sources of new knowledge, mainly in the fields of 
science and technology (Petruzzelli, 2011). In general terms, universities are inclined to 
build partnerships with firms for funding and research opportunities, filing patents for 
discoveries, creation of research centers, and/or the creation of internship programs to 
provide work experience for their graduates. By so doing, universities may increase the 
employment rate after graduation for their graduates. Firms also enjoy some advantages, 
e.g., higher quality of new hires, by collaborating with universities. Students who are at 
the top compared to their peers may have more access to research centers, internship 
programs, and research grants; also, they may obtain more exposure to potential 
employers. These students would be inclined to select better and highly reputed firms as 
their prospective employers. Accordingly, I propose that geographical distance from 
firms to universities will have a moderating effect on the relationship between highly 
reputed firms and the attraction of key human resources for innovation. Consequently, I 
propose the following hypotheses. 
 
Hypothesis 8. The proximity to a higher education institution moderates the 
relationship between firm reputation and human capital for innovation such that 
for firms closer to those institutions, the relationship is stronger. 
 
For years, scholars have been studying the principal drivers, or determinants for 
innovation. They found internal as well as external sources for innovation (Romijn and 
Albaladejo, 2002). These include, for example, the professional background or 
employees skills (internal), intensity of networking, proximity advantages, and receipt of 
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institutional support (external). Other scholars have found R&D expenditures, greater 
financial resources (slack resources) (Nohria and Gulati, 1996), technology transfer and 
networking to be the most influential determinants of innovation (Love and Roper, 1999; 
Rogers, 2004). In other attempts to study the antecedents of innovation, market structure, 
foreign ownership, firm age, firm size, and regional economic performance were argued 
to be important (Avermaete, Viaene, Morgan and Crawford, 2003). However, in this 
dissertation, these last determinants are considered as control variables. The following 
hypotheses argue that human and financial capital, as well as knowledge and new 
technologies access are determinants of innovation capability in the firm. 
In innovation research, five kinds of individuals contributing to innovation have 
been studied: idea generators, gatekeepers and boundary spanners, champions, sponsors, 
and project managers (Afuah, 2003 pg. 37). As idea generators may be found throughout 
the firm, the number of employees (human capital for innovation) is expected to capture 
these effects. Firm size is captured by the total assets of the firm in this dissertation. The 
correlation between these two variables is less than 0.18 per year, which provides 
information that both variables, assumed to measure the firm size in the literature, are in 
fact not correlated. 
Firms are in constant search for financial resources for innovation; previously, I 
explained that firms can borrow financial resources from a money-lending institution 
such as a bank acquiring a short or long term debt, which is a cheaper financial source 
compared to equity debt (Afuah, 2003). Banks also normally request collateral, such as 
physical assets. Firm reputation may reduce these requirements from lenders. In any 
event, financial resources are used to increase firm innovation capability. 
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Acquiring a foreign or domestic firm gives the acquiring firm the advantage of 
control over the unit. However, some drawbacks are found in acquisitions: there might be 
a mismatch in the managerial styles and or organizational cultures between the acquiring 
firm and the target. Foreign acquisitions can be more expensive than domestic ones 
(Afuah, 2003). After the acquisition transaction is completed, the acquiring firm will 
have access to the target firm’s knowledge base increasing its innovation capability. 
I postulate the following hypotheses. 
 
Hypothesis 9. Human capital for innovation is positively related to firm 
innovation capability. 
 
Hypothesis 10. Financial capital for innovation is positively related to firm 
innovation capability. 
 
Hypothesis 11. Knowledge and new technologies access (acquisitions) is 
positively related to firm innovation capability. 
 
Research studies argue that innovation is closely linked to firm performance and 
that it is possible to generate rents from innovation (Teece, 1986). The production of new 
products strengths the competitive position of the firm in relation to its competitors; this 
strategic position needs to be defended to achieve sustainable firm performance (Neely, 
1999); in other words, innovation is necessary but not sufficient for a sustainable 
performance. It is important to note that firm performance is not an outcome due solely to 
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innovation; other factors contribute to it. The moderating role of internationalization has 
been previously studied in efforts to explain the relationship between innovation and 
performance (Kafouros, Buckley, Sharp and Wang, 2008). However, in the following 
hypothesis I am postulating the direct relationship. 
 
Hypothesis 12. Firm innovation capability is positively related to firm 
performance. 
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CHAPTER IV 
SAMPLE, VARIABLES AND METHODOLOGY 
SAMPLE 
This dissertation studies the mediating effect of innovation on the relationship 
between corporate reputation and performance in US firms. As a starting point, I looked 
at reputational scores publicly published in the Fortune America’s Most Admired 
Companies website. Although 400+ firms’ reputational scores are reported each year, the 
principal criterion for selecting companies to be added in the sample was that each 
company should have reputation scores reported each year from 2006 to 2012. This 
would allow a longitudinal panel data structure for the sample. As a result of this 
criterion, 211 firms met the requirement for inclusion in the dataset. All of them are 
American companies, publicly traded, and within the Fortune 500 America’s Largest 
Corporations list. I considered expanding the year window for one previous year, i.e. 
2005, but the loss in the number of firms was considerable from 211 to 195. This would 
have represented a decrease of 7.5% in the numbers of firms included in the dataset. 
However, if we considered firm-year observations, there would be an increment of 5.6% 
in the observations ((195*8-211*7)/(211*7)). It was a trade-off between the number of 
firms included in the dataset vis-à-vis the number of observations. I decided to use the 
more conservative scenario in terms of observations. In other words, the sample dataset is 
for 2006 to 2012 with 211 US firms, providing 1,477 firm-year observations. 
Multiple data sources were utilized in this dissertation to minimize common 
method bias. Sources such as COMPUSTAT database, Directory of Corporate Affiliation 
(DCA) database, Securities Data Company (SDC) Platinum database, Fortune America’s 
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Most Admired Companies, United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) 
database, and U.S. News Universities Rankings were important and the principal sources 
of data for this research. 
Firms included in the sample dataset belong to different industries. The 
categorization was done by their respective Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) from 
the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) from the US Department of 
Labor (USDOL). Each firm has a SIC code of 4 digits. In the table below, the different 
divisions are considering 1 digit grouping. For example, Division B is for companies in 
the mining industry and the 2-digit SIC codes are from 10 to 14. Division C is for 
construction and SIC from 15 to 17. Division D is for manufacturing; SIC from 20 to 39. 
Division E is for transportation, communications, electric, gas, and sanitary services with 
SIC ranging from 40 to 49. Division F is for wholesale trade with SIC ranging from 50-
51. Division G for retail trade, SIC from 52-59. Division H for finance, insurance, and 
real estate, SIC from 60 to 67. Finally, Division I is for services with 2-digit SIC codes 
ranging from 70 to 89. The specific frequencies and percentages of firms in each division 
are shown in table 2. It is clearly noted that the proportion of manufacturing and service 
companies are almost balanced (37.91% to 59.72%), or 80 to 126 firms. Division B and 
division C (5 firms in total) could be considered as outliers in the study; however, they 
are included in all the analyses. As a result, a control dummy variable differentiating 
manufacturing versus service industry was created. In addition, the industry classification 
according to Fortune was recorded for robustness purposes. Details about variables will 
be provided in the next sections in this chapter. 
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Table 2. Distribution of firms per SIC division. 
Industry_sic Freq. Percent 
Division B 2 0.95 
Division C 3 1.42 
Division D 80 37.91 
Division E 22 10.43 
Division F 18 8.53 
Division G 29 13.74 
Division H 25 11.85 
Division I 32 15.17 
Total 211 100.00 
 
Companies are located in different cities and states within the continental U.S. 
However, it is possible to note some concentration in some specific locations. The 
following table shows a summary of the number of firms within the same zip code. The 
zip code, the city and the state are reported if at least 3 firms are located in the same zip 
code and/or neighboring zip codes; the neighboring zip code was analyzed using an 
internet tool (http://maps.huge.info/zip.htm). 
Table 3. Firms with similar geographical location. 
Zip Code City State Num. of firms 
10017 
New York NY 
1 
10019 2 
10022 4 
10036 3 
10105 1 
20817 Bethesda MD 3 
22042 Falls Church VA 3 
30339 Atlanta GA 3 
45202 Cincinnati OH 4 
60015 Deerfield 
IL 
3 
60026 Glenview 2 
60045 Lake Forest 1 
75039 Irving TX 2 
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75202 Dallas 2 
94043 Mountain View 
CA 
3 
94065 Redwood City 2 
94088 Sunnyvale 1 
 
Refer to the figure 5 for a pictorial representation of the firms with similar 
geographical location within the continental U.S. territory. 
Figure 5. Firms with similar geographical location in the US 
 
Source: U.S. Department of Agriculture (base map). Own contribution (dots). 
 
As explained before, 211 firms are included in the sample for this study with 
observations from 2006 to 2012 for all the variables explained in the following section. 
As a result, the structure of the sample is a longitudinal balanced panel dataset with 1,477 
observations in total. Firms are American corporations, publicly traded, and within the 
Fortune 500 biggest American firms list; these attributes facilitated the data collection 
from different information sources making it possible to build a balanced dataset. 
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VARIABLES 
Previous chapters in this dissertation helped to explain how other researchers have 
operationalized the variables in their respective studies. In the following sections, I will 
explain the sources, measures, and characteristics of the variables utilized in this study. 
Some variables act as independent and/or dependent variables depending on the 
hypothesis they are testing; accordingly, their exogeneity or endogeneity are taken into 
account at the moment of hypotheses testing. The following table lists variables with 
independent, dependent, or both roles in the dissertation. 
 
Table 4. List of selected variables and their roles in the dissertation 
Measure Main variable (s) Role 
Corporate reputation 
mac_score 
rank_overall 
rank_fortune 
rank_sic 
Independent 
Variable 
Degree of 
internationalization 
DOI_MJAV 
DOI_FSTS 
Independent 
Variable 
Distance to universities 
Totaldistance 
dist_entrep 
dist_eng 
dist_mktg 
Independent 
Variable 
Human capital attraction Employees Both 
Finacial capital attraction dlc dltt Both 
Knowledge and technology 
access 
num_acquisitions 
same_coutry 
same_SIC1 
same_SIC2 
Both 
Average ownership per 
acquisition ownedaftertransaction 
Independent 
Variable 
Innovation capability 
xrd 
patents 
inn_cap 
rd_patent 
Both 
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Firm performance 
sales_growth 
roa 
ros 
roe 
Dependent 
Variable 
Firm age firm_age year_founded 
Independent 
Variable 
Firm size assets_total Independent Variable 
Financial crisis years crisis_dummy Independent Variable 
 
Dependent Variable 
Firm Performance. The “purely” dependent variable in this dissertation, firm 
performance, is continuous. It is measured principally as sales growth. Sales growth 
confers “economies of scale, increased power, the ability to withstand environmental 
jolts, and eventually, likely greater profits” (Vissa and Chacar, 2009, p. 1183). Also, as 
this dissertation is principally assessing intangible assets (e.g., corporate reputation, 
knowledge, innovation capability) which are very complex in their performance 
assessment or measurement, the most appropriate performance outcome is sales growth 
of the company. However, other measures are considered in the study for robustness 
checks. These other measures are return on assets (ROA), return on equity (ROE), and 
return on sales (ROS) (Deephouse, 2000). These financial indicators have been utilized in 
the literature to assess firm success or performance. These variables were obtained from 
COMPUSTAT database. 
 
Independent Variables 
Corporate Reputation. The first “purely” independent variable in this dissertation 
is corporate reputation. It is continuous ranging theoretically from 0 to 10. However, 
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values are observed from 2.67 to 8.6 as the maximum value from 2006-2012. It was 
obtained from the Fortune America’s Most Admired Companies list from 2006 and 2012. 
As explained earlier, firms with reputation scores in the time window are included in the 
sample. In the dissertation, this variable is coded as “mac_score”. The following table 5 
shows the principal statistics of this variable. It is important to note the changes in 
corporate reputation previous, during, and after the financial crisis of 2008-2010. 
Specially, 2009 and 2010 were the years with the lowest mean in corporate reputation. 
Table 5. Corporate reputation per year. 
Variable Year Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Reputation Score 
[mac_score] 2006 211 6.58 0.94 3.20 8.60 
Reputation Score 
[mac_score] 2007 211 6.50 0.90 3.50 8.53 
Reputation Score 
[mac_score] 2008 211 6.57 0.92 4.02 8.44 
Reputation Score 
[mac_score] 2009 211 6.21 1.04 3.02 8.56 
Reputation Score 
[mac_score] 2010 211 6.08 1.01 2.67 8.15 
Reputation Score 
[mac_score] 2011 211 6.15 0.97 2.80 8.22 
Reputation Score 
[mac_score] 2012 211 6.13 1.02 3.36 8.42 
 
From the reputation scores website, it was also possible to obtain the rank the 
company occupied in a specific year. In simpler terms, the 400+ companies listed per 
year are ranked according to their reputation score; so, I recorded the position the 
companies included in the sample occupied in a certain year. I coded this variable as 
“rank_overall”. Theoretically, this variable ranges from 1 to 400+ and is ordinal. Table 6 
summarizes the variable statistics. 
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Table 6. Descriptive statistics of the overall rank per year. 
Variable Year Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
rank_overall 2006 211 228.44 158.65 1 582 
rank_overall 2007 211 241.73 160.24 2 585 
rank_overall 2008 211 244.27 166.18 6 601 
rank_overall 2009 211 195.04 134.20 1 461 
rank_overall 2010 211 176.09 117.06 2 408 
rank_overall 2011 211 177.87 119.58 1 417 
rank_overall 2012 211 192.18 124.04 1 428 
 
In the literature, it was noted that corporate reputation scores vary across 
industries (Fombrun and Shanley, 1990; Rindova, Williamson, Petkova, and Sever, 
2005); as a result, I recorded the rank order by industry. In the America’s Most Admired 
Companies list, Fortune has its own classification of industries which varies from the SIC 
classification. Accordingly, I recorded the ranks with the Fortune classification. Then, I 
matched and converted the Fortune industry classifications into their SIC equivalence. 
Ranks were recorded taking into account the position the firms occupied from the 
complete list per year per industry (400+ firms). These variables are recorded as 
“rank_fortune” and “rank_sic”. The following tables 7 and 8 list the number of firms in 
different ranks per year. Fortune industry classification has 40+ items such as aerospace 
and defense, airlines, apparel, beverages, furniture, etc. 
 
Table 7. Number of firms per year per rank-industry by Fortune classification 
Year rank_fortune 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
2006 35 25 33 29 20 16 17 18 11 7 0 0 0 0 0 
2007 26 33 29 27 23 18 20 14 11 9 1 0 0 0 0 
2008 30 38 25 25 22 19 18 11 12 9 1 1 0 0 0 
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2009 39 40 25 27 26 21 12 9 4 3 5 0 0 0 0 
2010 40 40 29 27 21 18 17 8 5 0 5 1 0 0 0 
2011 41 38 33 25 20 22 15 7 5 0 1 2 1 1 0 
2012 40 37 29 30 20 19 19 6 4 1 3 1 0 1 1 
Total 251 251 203 190 152 133 118 73 52 29 16 5 1 2 1 
 
In the case of “rank_sic”, there are 8 divisions in which firms were ranked from 
the complete dataset of raw reputation scores (400+ firms). The following table shows a 
summary of number of firms per industry SIC division per year. 
Table 8. Summary of firms per industry division per year by SIC classification 
Year Division Total B C D E F G H I 
2006-2012 2 3 80 22 18 29 25 32 211 
 
Degree of Internationalization. This variable is continuous and was calculated by 
using two databases: DCA (for the breadth of internationalization: number of countries in 
which the firm operates and foreign subsidiaries to total subsidiaries) and COMPUSTAT 
segments (for the depth of internationalization: foreign sales to total sales). This variable 
was coded as “DOI_MJAV”. This method of calculating the degree of 
internationalization is another contribution of the dissertation providing more detail to the 
foreign sales to total sales DOI, or “DOI_FSTS”. However, FSTS was obtained in order 
to run robustness checks in the models. The following table summarizes the descriptive 
statistics and correlation matrix between these measures. The correlation is significant 
(p<0.001). 
 
51 
Table 9. Descriptive statistics of DOIs and correlation matrix. 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max DOI_FSTS DOI_MJAV 
DOI_FSTS 0.31 0.23 0 0.95 1.00  
DOI_MJAV 2.96 5.25 0 37.08 0.57 1.00 
 
Distance to universities. This variable is continuous and is calculated by the 
Euclidean distance between two locations (zip codes) in the US. First, I obtained the list 
of the top 5 universities in the areas of Marketing, Entrepreneurship, and Engineering as 
these disciplines are more related to innovation. The list was obtained from the US News 
Best Graduate Schools for 2012. It is assumed that these rankings do not change 
drastically within 5 years. Perhaps, the first ranked school descends to the second or third 
position, but the list of the top five would not be too different during the 2006-2012. I 
recorded the zip code of the universities in the disciplines and calculated the distance to 
the firm’s headquarters zip code in miles. The distance calculation was made using an 
online tool (http://www.zip-codes.com/distance_calculator.asp). Then, I added the 
distances from the firm’s headquarters to the top 5 universities in each discipline 
obtaining “dist_eng”, “dist_mktg”, and “dist_entrep” for engineering, marketing, and 
entrepreneurship, respectively. In order to calculate the total distance, “totaldistance”, 
from the firm’s headquarters to all of the universities in the list, i.e. top 5 universities in 
the 3 disciplines, I added the distances without repeating distances of universities that 
were ranked in more than one discipline as a top 5. For example, Harvard University was 
ranked in 2 disciplines as the top 5. The following table 10 summarizes the distances 
from the firm’s headquarters to the universities. 
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Table 10. Summary of distances to universities. 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
totaldistance 11758.17 2926.93 9040.59 18354.67 
dist_eng 7076.74 1003.77 5185.06 9710.90 
dist_mktg 5380.26 2010.83 3714.11 9625.74 
dist_entrep 5891.24 2506.52 2967.55 10602.68 
 
Human capital attraction. This variable can be considered an independent or 
dependent variable contingent upon what hypothesis is being analyzed. In any event, the 
variable takes integer positive values as it refers to the number of employees in the firm. 
This variable was obtained from COMPUSTAT and cross-validated with the DCA 
database. Number of employees is considered a proxy for human capital attraction. It has 
been studied in the literature about the positive effects of reputation on people searching 
for employment (Cable and Graham, 2000), attraction of better quality human resources 
(Turban and Cable, 2003), and consumers’ decision to work for highly reputed firms 
(Henard and Dacin, 2010). In the following table 11, the descriptive statistics are 
reported. The company with the smallest number of employees is World Fuel Services 
and the company with the largest is Walmart. 
 
Table 11. Descriptive statistics of the number of employees per year. 
Variable year Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
employees 2006 81635.56 149165.4 647 1,800,000 
employees 2007 85388.48 156948.5 743 1,900,000 
employees 2008 87744.51 168025.0 916 2,100,000 
employees 2009 89402.10 166796.7 1,164 2,100,000 
employees 2010 86706.17 163664.2 1,249 2,100,000 
employees 2011 88273.41 164920.7 1,499 2,100,000 
employees 2012 90903.97 172312.5 1,798 2,200,000 
53 
Financial capital attraction. Firms need financial resources for growth, 
investments, and R&D operations. Two of the cheapest sources for financial capital are 
short- and long-term debt because equity (ownership) is not involved. This variable is 
continuous and obtained from COMPUSTAT database. It was coded as “dlc” and “dltt”, 
for debt in current liabilities and long-term debt, respectively. In the first case, “dlc” 
represents the total amount of short-term notes and the current portion of long-term debt 
(debt due in one year). In the case of “dltt”, the variable represents debt obligations due 
more than one year from the company’s balance sheet date. The following table 
summarizes the descriptive statistics of both variables per year. 
Table 12. Descriptive statistics of short- and long-term debt per year. 
Year Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
2006 dlc 211 10255.34 53594.12 0.00 429216.00 dltt 211 8831.56 26876.17 0.00 212281.00 
2007 dlc 211 10898.69 61429.94 0.00 499293.00 dltt 211 10096.21 30793.21 0.00 260804.00 
2008 dlc 211 11924.78 65271.84 0.00 562857.00 dltt 211 11920.68 38362.45 0.00 326443.00 
2009 dlc 211 10517.12 52547.71 0.00 449196.00 dltt 211 12992.44 39709.39 0.00 330067.00 
2010 dlc 211 8969.61 47588.34 0.00 423853.00 dltt 211 14066.80 45936.89 0.00 377138.00 
2011 dlc 211 9524.05 50880.77 0.00 394572.00 dltt 211 13928.87 44880.82 0.00 360681.00 
2012 dlc 211 9197.12 48316.29 0.00 387738.00 dltt 211 13109.59 37506.98 0.00 315832.00 
 
Knowledge and technology access. This variable was obtained from the SDC 
Platinum database in the mergers and acquisitions module. The variable measures the 
total number of acquisitions per year made by the firm, “num_acquisitions”. SDC 
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Platinum provides information about the location of those acquisitions, as well as, the 
industry for the target firm, and the percentage of ownership prior and after the 
transaction. As a result, I recorded whether the acquisitions were made in the same 
country; i.e. United States, “same_country”. Also, I recorded whether it was a related 
acquisition by the 1- and 2-digit SIC code for industry classification, “same_SIC1” and 
“same_SIC2”, respectively. These variables are positive integers and their descriptive 
statistics are reported in the table below. 
Table 13. Descriptive statistics for knowledge/technology access 
Year Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
2006 
num_acquisitions 211 4.95 5.41 1 32 
same_country 211 3.59 3.81 0 24 
sameSIC1 211 3.54 4.19 0 31 
sameSIC2 211 2.95 3.65 0 31 
2007 
num_acquisitions 211 3.38 4.02 1 28 
same_country 211 2.33 2.62 0 21 
sameSIC1 211 2.49 2.88 0 19 
sameSIC2 211 2.14 2.52 0 19 
2008 
num_acquisitions 211 2.78 2.93 1 26 
same_country 211 1.77 1.69 0 14 
sameSIC1 211 2.08 2.27 0 23 
sameSIC2 211 1.76 2.16 0 23 
2009 
num_acquisitions 211 2.42 1.81 1 11 
same_country 211 1.63 1.43 0 10 
sameSIC1 211 1.81 1.52 0 9 
sameSIC2 211 1.55 1.41 0 9 
2010 
num_acquisitions 211 2.62 2.58 1 27 
same_country 211 1.73 1.95 0 20 
sameSIC1 211 1.91 2.13 0 26 
sameSIC2 211 1.72 2.10 0 26 
2011 
num_acquisitions 211 2.63 2.47 1 27 
same_country 211 1.82 1.82 0 18 
sameSIC1 211 1.96 1.88 0 20 
sameSIC2 211 1.75 1.87 0 20 
2012 num_acquisitions 211 2.87 2.63 1 16 
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same_country 211 2.00 2.08 0 15 
sameSIC1 211 2.00 1.84 0 13 
sameSIC2 211 1.68 1.70 0 13 
 
Innovation capability. This variable was recorded from multiple sources: 
COMPUSTAT, ORBIS, DCA, USPTO, and the firms’ annual reports. The first variable 
is about the R&D expenses, “xrd”. It measures the amount of dollars invested in research 
and development that the firms spent in a given year. As a result, it is a continuous 
variable. Second, “patents” is an integer number which reflects the number of patents 
provided to the firm in a given year. Third, a measure of innovation efficiency was 
obtained by dividing R&D expenses by the number of patents per year. This variable, 
“rd_patent” measures the amount of dollars spent per patent in a given year. In other 
words, it measures the efficiency of the firm to convert dollars spent in R&D into patents 
in order to protect the intellectual property or knowledge. Finally, innovation capability, 
“inn_cap”, was measured as a ratio between R&D and revenues or sales; it provides 
information about how much commitment the firm has to research and development 
(innovation) compared to the sales or revenues it receives (Garcia and Calantone, 2002; 
Kaul, 2012). Descriptive statistics are reported in the following table. 
 
Table 14. Descriptive statistics for innovation capabilities. 
Year Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
2006 
xrd 211 559.09 1305.36 10.50 9094.00 
patents 211 115.90 229.21 22.00 1808.00 
rd_patent 211 4.59 7.12 0.23 63.03 
inn_cap 211 0.03 0.05 0.00 0.25 
2007 xrd 211 665.33 1429.79 6.50 8434.00 patents 211 143.37 282.41 21.00 2111.00 
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rd_patent 211 4.67 7.47 0.12 59.30 
inn_cap 211 0.04 0.07 0.00 0.61 
2008 
xrd 211 691.33 1491.22 7.00 8487.00 
patents 211 139.73 255.09 39.00 1864.00 
rd_patent 211 4.68 7.56 0.11 61.34 
inn_cap 211 0.03 0.05 0.00 0.32 
2009 
xrd 211 733.56 1572.14 7.20 9010.00 
patents 211 140.55 254.51 45.00 2043.00 
rd_patent 211 5.33 11.95 0.11 137.72 
inn_cap 211 0.04 0.06 0.00 0.40 
2010 
xrd 211 677.08 1416.13 6.50 8714.00 
patents 211 160.75 281.86 55.00 2929.00 
rd_patent 211 3.71 6.35 0.08 64.95 
inn_cap 211 0.03 0.05 0.00 0.34 
2011 
xrd 211 748.01 1628.06 9.00 10991.00 
patents 211 204.93 333.32 70.00 3121.00 
rd_patent 211 3.30 6.55 0.10 70.49 
inn_cap 211 0.03 0.05 0.00 0.31 
2012 
xrd 211 798.96 1698.27 13.00 9811.00 
patents 211 211.72 300.05 72.00 2368.00 
rd_patent 211 3.30 7.14 0.11 75.12 
inn_cap 211 0.03 0.05 0.00 0.27 
 
Control Variables 
The ownership after the acquisition transaction. This variable was coded as 
“ownedaftertransaction” and it was measured as the average of the firm’s ownership after 
the deals for the acquisitions in a given year. The variable is continuous and positive. The 
source is SDC Platinum. 
Firm age. This variable is positive and an integer. The firm founding year, 
“year_founded”, was obtained from DCA database and it is subtracted from the years of 
the study time window. The variable is coded as “firm_age”. 
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Firm size. This variable is continuous based on total firm assets. “assets_total” 
was obtained from COMPUSTAT. 
Financial crisis. This is a dummy variable, “crisis_dummy”. It takes the value of 1 
if the year is 2008, 2009, and 2010. It takes the value of 0 otherwise. This variable 
represents the years for the financial crisis in the U.S. 
 
METHODOLOGY 
The hypotheses were tested using the statistical software STATA (v.11). The 
estimation method was the Arellano-Bond linear dynamic panel-data (Arellano and 
Bond, 1991). The command in STATA is “xtabond”. According to the help command in 
STATA, linear dynamic panel-data models include lags of the dependent variable as 
covariates and contain unobserved panel-level effects. These effects are correlated with 
the lagged dependent variables; as a result, standard estimators such as OLS provide 
inconsistent estimates. In order to fix this problem, Arellano and Bond (1991) developed 
a consistent generalized method of moments (GMM) estimator which takes into account 
the panel-level effects which is the “xtabond” command. Also, causality explanations are 
improved by using a longitudinal panel data structure (Allison, 1984). 
This estimator is designed for datasets with many panels (211 firms) and few 
periods (7 years). It requires that there be no autocorrelation in the errors. As a result, 
differences are calculated for all the variables before estimating the coefficients; by so 
doing, the number of years in the dataset will be reduced to 6; from 2007-2012, as the 
2006 observations will be used to calculate the first difference (2007-2006 values). 
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Also, I configured the estimation method (xtabond) to lag the variables by 1 and 2 
years prior to the year of estimation resulting in 4 years for the observations. In total 844 
observations, or 211 firms for 4 years are available for the analyses and hypotheses 
testing. Figure 6 below shows the elimination of 2006 as it is used for the first difference 
to reduce autocorrelation and the four possible runs with 2 and 1 year lag effects of the 
independent (IV) and dependent (DV) variables on the dependent variable at time “t”. 
In other words, DV(t)=IV(t-2)+IV(t-1)+DV(t-2)+DV(t-1) 
Figure 6. Lags for the linear dynamic panel data methodology 
 
 
The major contribution of this doctoral dissertation is to empirically test the 
mediating effect of innovation capability (R&D expenses) between corporate reputation 
and performance. A basic mediating variable model can be observed in the following 
figure 7 adapted from MacKinnon, Lockwood, Hoffman, West and Sheets (2002). 
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Figure 7. Structure of a basic mediating effect. 
 
Source: Adapted from Mackinnon et al. (2002) 
The equations used to estimate the mediating effect follow studies by Baron and 
Kenny (1986) and MacKinnon et al. (2002). 
Performance = g0(1) + tau * Reputation + e(1)    Equation 4-1 
Performance = g0(2) + tau’ * Reputation + beta * Innovation + e(2) Equation 4-2 
Innovation = g0(3) + alpha * Reputation + e(3)    Equation 4-3 
In these equations, Reputation is the independent variable, Performance is the 
dependent variable, and Innovation is the mediating variable. g0(1), g0(2), and g0(3) are 
the regression intercepts in Equations 4-1, 4-2, and 4-3, respectively. “tau” represents the 
relationship between the independent and dependent variables in Equation 4-1, “ tau’ ” 
represents the relationship between the independent and dependent variables adjusted for 
the effects of the mediating variable in Equation 4-2, “alpha” represents the relationship 
between the independent and mediating variables in Equation 4-3, “beta” represents the 
relationship between the mediating and the dependent variables adjusted for the effect of 
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the independent variable in Equation 4-2, and e(1), e(2), and e(3) are the residuals in 
Equations 4-1, 4-2, and 4-3, respectively. 
In order to test the mediating effect, first, the direct effect between corporate 
reputation and performance must be confirmed (Equation 4-1), i.e. the coefficient needs 
to be significant. Once results show statistical significance, Equation 4-3 is tested to show 
relationship between the predictor variable and the mediating variable. Results need to 
show a significant coefficient between these variables. Later, Equation 4-2 is tested to 
confirm the hypothesis about the mediating effect of innovation on corporate reputation 
and performance. Fully mediating effects are rare in social sciences studies (Baron and 
Kenny, 1986); therefore, I expect to find partially mediated effects in the statistical 
testing. In other words, I expect “ tau’ ” and “beta” to be statistically different from zero 
in Equation 4-2. The mediating analysis in this dissertation will be performed using the 
Arellano-Bond dynamic linear panel data estimation method. 
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CHAPTER V 
RESULTS 
As a first step in this section, I report the descriptive statistics table for all the 
variables which will be considered for the hypotheses testing. The structure of the study 
is longitudinal panel data; as a result, results are reported on a yearly basis. For 
organization purposes, only tables for 2006 and 2012, i.e. the first and last year in the 
database, are reported below (Tables 15 and 16, respectively). The coding for the 
variables names is explained in the previous chapter. 
Table 15. Descriptive statistics for 2006. 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
mac_score 6.58 0.94 3.20 8.60 
rank_overall 228.44 158.65 1.00 582.00 
rank_fortune 4.40 2.64 1.00 10.00 
rank_sic 44.86 41.81 1.00 201.00 
employees 81635.56 149165.40 647.00 1800000.00 
manufacturing_dummy 0.38 0.49 0.00 1.00 
dist_entrep 5891.24 2511.63 2967.55 10602.68 
dist_mktg 5380.26 2014.93 3714.11 9625.74 
dist_eng 7076.74 1005.82 5185.06 9710.90 
totaldistance 11758.17 2932.89 9040.59 18354.67 
Dom_sales 17626.22 21461.23 984.00 129041.00 
Frg_sales 8355.64 20601.47 0.00 252680.00 
Tot_sales 25981.86 36934.45 1443.60 365467.00 
DOI_FSTS 0.29 0.22 0.00 0.87 
subsidiary_USA 43.55 88.47 0.00 982.00 
subsidiary_notUSA 17.55 33.17 0.00 261.00 
subsidiary_total 61.10 103.57 1.00 996.00 
FsubTsub 0.28 0.29 0.00 1.00 
num_country 9.65 12.54 1.00 73.00 
DOI_MJAV 2.17 4.27 0.00 29.20 
dlc 10255.34 53594.12 0.00 429216.00 
dltt 8831.56 26876.17 0.00 212281.00 
num_acquisitions 4.95 5.41 1.00 32.00 
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same_country 3.59 3.81 0.00 24.00 
sameSIC2 2.95 3.65 0.00 31.00 
sameSIC1 3.54 4.19 0.00 31.00 
firm_age 71.88 47.24 5.00 222.00 
xrd 559.09 1305.36 10.50 9094.00 
patents 115.90 229.21 22.00 1808.00 
inn_cap 0.03 0.05 0.00 0.25 
rd_patent 4.59 7.12 0.23 63.03 
assets_total 67872.62 202635.50 774.98 1884318.00 
net_income 2293.34 4692.31 -12613.00 39500.00 
sales_growth 0.12 0.16 -0.33 1.28 
Sales 29282.97 45348.40 1243.28 345977.00 
Ros 0.08 0.09 -0.46 0.40 
Roa 0.07 0.06 -0.32 0.31 
Roe 0.19 0.51 -3.04 4.34 
 
Table 16. Descriptive statistics for 2012. 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
mac_score 6.13 1.02 3.36 8.42 
rank_overall 192.18 124.04 1.00 428.00 
rank_fortune 3.96 2.64 1.00 15.00 
rank_sic 38.08 29.96 1.00 123.00 
employees 90903.97 172312.50 1798.00 2200000.00 
manufacturing_dummy 0.38 0.49 0.00 1.00 
dist_entrep 5891.24 2511.63 2967.55 10602.68 
dist_mktg 5380.26 2014.93 3714.11 9625.74 
dist_eng 7076.74 1005.82 5185.06 9710.90 
totaldistance 11758.17 2932.89 9040.59 18354.67 
Dom_sales 22049.91 25855.49 407.00 151298.00 
Frg_sales 11994.99 24850.21 0.00 301825.00 
Tot_sales 34044.90 43053.41 1545.03 453123.00 
DOI_FSTS 0.33 0.24 0.00 0.95 
subsidiary_USA 30.93 42.52 0.00 302.00 
subsidiary_notUSA 20.59 34.29 0.00 246.00 
subsidiary_total 51.52 63.51 1.00 422.00 
FsubTsub 0.36 0.30 0.00 1.00 
num_country 11.52 12.55 1.00 61.00 
DOI_MJAV 3.38 5.63 0.00 32.52 
dlc 9197.12 48316.29 0.00 387738.00 
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dltt 13109.59 37506.98 0.00 315832.00 
num_acquisitions 2.87 2.63 1.00 16.00 
same_country 2.00 2.08 0.00 15.00 
sameSIC2 1.68 1.70 0.00 13.00 
sameSIC1 2.00 1.84 0.00 13.00 
firm_age 77.70 47.14 11.00 228.00 
xrd 798.96 1698.27 13.00 9811.00 
patents 211.72 300.05 72.00 2368.00 
inn_cap 0.03 0.05 0.00 0.27 
rd_patent 3.30 7.14 0.11 75.12 
assets_total 90125.98 251751.20 1277.14 2209974.00 
net_income 2570.34 5634.63 -12650.00 44880.00 
sales_growth 0.03 0.12 -0.75 0.73 
Sales 36692.01 54319.94 1545.03 462534.00 
Ros 0.07 0.09 -0.56 0.32 
Roa 0.05 0.07 -0.30 0.34 
Roe 0.47 4.86 -4.01 70.38 
 
The distributions of the observations per year on selected variables are shown in 
the following figures. For organization purposes, I am reporting the box plots for the 
reputation scores, degree of internationalization (FSTS), and sales growth. 
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Figure 8. Box plot for reputation scores per year. 
 
 
Figure 9. Box plot for degree of internationalization (FSTS) per year. 
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Figure 10. Box plot for sales growth per year. 
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firms with lower reputation scores (outliers in the low end) are Citigroup, Ford Motor 
Co., General Motors, Office Depot, Unisys, and Delta Airlines among the more salient. 
In the case of Ford, the lower values are found in 2009 and 2010; which we may attribute 
to the global financial crisis. GM’s lowest score is found in 2011 which is the year after 
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emerged from chapter 11 in April 2007 with great results after that. “Delta takes flight” 
was the title of one article in USNews in May 2007. 
In the case of the box plots for DOI_FSTS, the results show more homogeneity 
among the firms throughout the years. For the last figure, sales growth results show 
variance among the firms. This is expected and required in dependent variables with 
respect to methodological aspects. There are outliers in the upper and lower ends of the 
box plot providing more variance to the dependent variable. 
The following table shows the results for the correlation matrix for the main 
variables in 2006 and 2012. These variables are sales growth (dependent variable), 
reputation scores, number of employees, debt, acquisitions in the same country, the 
proposed degree of internationalization, the total distance from the firms’ headquarters to 
top universities, and R&D expenses. 
Table 17. Correlation matrix for the main variables in 2006. 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1. sales_growth 1       
2. mac_score -0.05 1      
3. employees -0.07 0.08 1     
4. dlc 0.23*** -0.02 0.10+ 1    
5. same_country 0.15* 0.20** -0.05 0.15* 1   
6. DOI_MJAV -0.12+ 0.12+ 0.03 0.04 0.21** 1  
7. totaldistance 0.15* 0.12+ -0.10+ -0.11+ 0.13+ 0.08 1 
8. xrd -0.11+ 0.02 0.08 0.05 0.28*** 0.57*** 0.04 
Note: *** (p-value<0.001); ** (p-value<0.01); * (p-value<0.05); + (p-value<0.1) 
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Table 18. Correlation matrix for the main variables in 2012. 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1. sales_growth 1       
2. mac_score 0.28*** 1      
3. employees 0.00 0.11+ 1     
4. dlc -0.12+ -0.05 0.09 1    
5. same_country 0.14* 0.16* -0.06 -0.02 1   
6. DOI_MJAV -0.06 0.29*** 0.02 0.03 0.05 1  
7. totaldistance 0.07 0.12+ -0.06 -0.10 0.25*** 0.08 1 
8. xrd 0.03 0.15* 0.03 0.00 0.30*** 0.35*** 0.14* 
Note: *** (p-value<0.001); ** (p-value<0.01); * (p-value<0.05); + (p-value<0.1) 
 
All the correlation coefficients are within the acceptable range of smaller than 0.3 
in absolute values with the exception of the correlation between R&D expenses (“xrd”) 
and the proposed degree of internationalization (“DOI_MJAV”). In other words, firms 
which are more international spend more in R&D. This phenomenon is not surprising as 
firms engaging in international expansion need to invest more resources for new product 
development, especially if the strategy for the expansion is market-seeking (Dunning, 
1995); they need to have products appealing to foreign customers, or they need to adapt 
their current products to the local “taste” (the I-R framework) (Bartlett and Ghoshal, 
1987). 
The estimation method selected for this dissertation is the Arellano-Bond linear 
dynamic panel-data which is an appropriate methodology to analyze longitudinal panel 
data with several panels (211 firms) and few periods (7 years) (Arellano and Bond, 
1991). The command in STATA v11 is “xtabond”. Four control variables were added to 
all the hypotheses testing. The first one is the dummy variable for the global financial 
crisis years. The second is the firm age, which literature predicted some relevance for 
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corporate reputation, and for innovation capability. According to Schumpeter, bigger and 
older firms tend to innovate more. Therefore, the third variable is firm size measured by 
the total assets in the company. Finally, the fourth control variable is the profitability of 
the company measured by the net income at year “t”. 
Testing hypothesis 1. 
Hypothesis 1 argues that innovation capability expressed in R&D expenses 
mediates the relationship between firm reputation and performance. In order to confirm 
the mediating effect, the methodologies by Baron and Kenny (1986) and MacKinnon et 
al. (2002) were followed as guidelines. In those studies, the authors explain the 
procedures to test for mediation. Basically the first step is to confirm the relationship 
between the predictor variable (firm reputation) and the response variable (firm 
performance). After, a relationship between the predictor variable (firm reputation) and 
the mediator variable (innovation capability) needs to be confirmed. Finally, the predictor 
and mediating variable need to be regressed on the outcome variable. Results of these 
three steps are shown in the figure below. The first step results are shown in the upper 
part of the figure. The firm reputation (mac_score) variable has been regressed with lag2 
and lag3 with the outcome variable (sales_growth). Control variables are considered 
endogenous in the model. The xtabond command regresses endogenous variables with 
exogenous instrumental variables (45 in this case) to minimize the endogeneity problems. 
Results show a positive and significant relationship (p=0.014) between firm reputation at 
time t-3 and firm performance at time t. The second condition is shown in the middle part 
of the figure. Relationships between the predictor variable (lag 2 and lag3) and the 
mediating variable at time t are confirmed (p=0.019 and p=0.022, respectively). Finally, 
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the predictor and mediating variables are included together in the model. Results show 
that, indeed, there is evidence of a mediating effect. Lag3 of the firm reputation is 
positively and significant (p=0.002) related to the outcome variable at time t 
(sales_growth), and the lag2 of the innovation capability (R&D expenses) is significantly 
(p=0.038) related to the outcome variable at time t. Results confirmed the mediating 
effect of innovation on the relationship between firm reputation and performance in US 
firms, which is the main contribution of the dissertation. 
Figure 11. Results for hypothesis 1. 
                                                                               
       _cons    -.8161267   .5335081    -1.53   0.126    -1.861783    .2295299
              
         L3.     .0336072   .0136713     2.46   0.014     .0068119    .0604025
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   mac_score  
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sales_growth  
                                                                              
sales_growth        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
One-step results
                                             Prob > chi2           =    0.0000
Number of instruments =     45               Wald chi2(7)          =     69.23
                                                               max =         3
                                                               avg =         3
                                             Obs per group:    min =         3
Time variable: year
Group variable: id                           Number of groups      =       211
Arellano-Bond dynamic panel-data estimation  Number of obs         =       633
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It is worthwhile to mention that the mediating variable was included as an 
endogenous variable in the model. Instrumental variables (50) were used to minimize 
issues with endogeneity. Xtabond includes the instrumental variables by default when 
variables are included as endogenous in the model before the estimation process. 
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Testing hypothesis 2. 
This hypothesis argues that the firm reputation score is positively related to the 
number of employees in subsequent years. In other words, high reputation attracts job 
applicants increasing the firm’s applicants pool. As a result, the company may have more 
chances to select the “best” candidate for the position increasing the number of 
employees in the following years. The following figures report results obtained from 
hypothesis analyses. 
Figure 12. Results for hypothesis 2. 
 
 
Results show the positive relationship between reputation scores in t-1 (p=0.012) 
and t-2 (p=0.001) and the number of employees at time t. Results not only show the 
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crisis_dummy    -0.1002    0.0781    1.0000                                                   
L2.employees    -0.5356    1.0000                                                             
 L.employees     1.0000                                                                       
                                                                                              
        e(V)   employ~s  employ~s  crisis~y  firm_age  assets~l  net_in~e  mac_sc~e  mac_sc~e 
                      L.       L2.                                                L.       L2.
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relationship exists, but also the causal relationship between these two variables. Results 
for the control variables are also consistent. For example, when the crisis_dummy 
variable is 1, i.e. the year is part of the global financial crisis period of time, the number 
of employees is decreased. Firms tend to reduce the number of employees when such a 
difficult times arise. In the case of net income, if it goes up, then the number of 
employees is reduced. This can be explained due to the nature of the income. It is 
calculated by the total revenues minus all the costs before taxes. Considering the salaries 
of employees as a cost, it is logical to think that if the company reduces the number of 
employees, their costs will also be reduced; therefore, the net income will increase, 
ceteris paribus. Finally, the number of employees in previous years is also a significant 
predictor for the number of employees at time t. 
In the correlation matrix for the results coefficients, we can observe acceptable 
values. All the values are below the accepted 0.3 in absolute terms except 4 correlations: 
the correlation between the constant and the crisis_dummy and firm_age which are not a 
major problem because it is the correlation with a constant. The correlation between lag1 
and lag2 of the number of employees is normal since these variables are dependent on 
each other. Finally, the correlation between firm_age and crisis_dummy is high; however, 
these variables are control variables not affecting the results for the main variables. It is 
important to note that the control variables were included as endogenous variables and 
the reputation score as exogenous in the Arellano-Bond estimation process. This is 
important because each endogenous variable is evaluated using instrumental variables in 
order to control for endogeneity issues; the xtabond command performs the calculations 
with instrumental variables; in this case, it used 53 instrumental variables. Xtabond 
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command does not directly provide variance inflation factor (VIF) values. I reran the 
model as if it were an OLS; this approach is more biased than the dynamic linear panel 
data estimation, but it provides a good sense of the VIFs and multicollinearity issues. The 
VIF values are below 3.3 for the lagged independent variable and 1.14 for the control 
variables. Since multicollinearity seems not present in the OLS regression, we can expect 
that it is also not an issue for the xtabond procedure as it increases the power in the 
model. In summary, these results support hypothesis 2. 
Testing hypothesis 3. 
Hypothesis 3 suggests that the firm reputation score is positively related to the 
financial sources for innovation. Firms with higher reputation will find more “cheap” 
financial sources with less constraints and/or guarantees. As explained earlier, these 
financial sources are short and long term debts which are not related to equity or issuance 
of stock options for the loans. Control variables remain the same for the following 
models in order to make comparisons between different hypothesis testing models. The 
following figures report the results for this hypothesis. 
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Figure 13. Results for hypothesis 3. 
 
 
Results show that lag1(p=0.054) and lag2(p<0.001) for the firm reputation are 
good predictors for the short and long term debt (“dlc”) for firms. Lag2 for reputation is 
strongly significant when predicting the debt at time t. These results suggest that banks 
and other financial institutions may base their lending decisions by observing the firms’ 
past reputation scores, ceteris paribus. The correlation matrix for the coefficients also 
shows acceptable results. No other correlation pair is above 0.3 other than the constant 
with crisis_dummy, the constant with firm_age and the firm_age with crisis_dummy. The 
VIF values assuming OLS estimation show that the independent variable values are 
                                                                              
       _cons     21256.93   30339.08     0.70   0.484    -38206.57    80720.42
              
         L2.     2807.301   683.7139     4.11   0.000     1467.246    4147.355
         L1.     1345.986   698.6258     1.93   0.054    -23.29573    2715.267
   mac_score  
              
  net_income    -.4504539   .0866868    -5.20   0.000    -.6203568   -.2805509
assets_total    -.0902702   .0188443    -4.79   0.000    -.1272044    -.053336
    firm_age    -361.1218   378.6962    -0.95   0.340    -1103.353    381.1091
crisis_dummy    -2614.704   1043.695    -2.51   0.012    -4660.309   -569.0981
              
         L2.    -.3396009   .0251747   -13.49   0.000    -.3889425   -.2902593
         L1.     .3208917     .02641    12.15   0.000     .2691291    .3726543
         dlc  
                                                                              
         dlc        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
One-step results
                                             Prob > chi2           =    0.0000
Number of instruments =     53               Wald chi2(8)          =    409.12
                                                               max =         4
                                                               avg =         4
                                             Obs per group:    min =         4
Time variable: year
Group variable: id                           Number of groups      =       211
Arellano-Bond dynamic panel-data estimation  Number of obs         =       844
       _cons     0.0063   -0.0205   -0.7348   -0.9824    0.1458    0.0842   -0.2665   -0.1663 
L2.mac_score    -0.0383    0.0751   -0.2039    0.0529   -0.0973    0.0197   -0.1312    1.0000 
 L.mac_score    -0.0273    0.0229   -0.0462    0.1505   -0.0229   -0.0152    1.0000           
  net_income     0.0518    0.0414   -0.0556   -0.0836   -0.2270    1.0000                     
assets_total     0.0410   -0.1478    0.0196   -0.1878    1.0000                               
    firm_age    -0.0060    0.0089    0.7925    1.0000                                         
crisis_dummy    -0.0191   -0.0576    1.0000                                                   
      L2.dlc    -0.2503    1.0000                                                             
       L.dlc     1.0000                                                                       
                                                                                              
        e(V)        dlc       dlc  crisis~y  firm_age  assets~l  net_in~e  mac_sc~e  mac_sc~e 
                      L.       L2.                                                L.       L2.
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below 3.34 and below 4.05 for the control variables. Again, these results show no 
multicollinearity issues present in the model. Results support hypothesis 3. 
Testing hypothesis 4. 
Hypothesis 4 argues that firm reputation scores are positively related to the 
number of acquisitions achieved by a focal firm. Firms need to constantly search for new 
technologies and knowledge not only within the firm, but also outside firm boundaries. 
Information about the number of acquisitions (domestic and international) has been 
collected as well as the industry of such acquisitions (related vs unrelated). The ratio 
between domestic versus international acquisitions is 73% for the entire sample. In other 
words, US firms prefer domestic acquisitions in about 3/4 of cases on average. The 
sample also shows that on average, US firms acquire companies in their same 2-digit SIC 
classification in 71% of cases providing information that US firms are acquiring related 
firms (low risk). The figures show the results for this hypothesis testing. 
Figure 14. Results for hypothesis 4. 
                                                                               
       _cons    -2.395152    6.45476    -0.37   0.711    -15.04625    10.25594
              
         L2.     .2349097   .1399032     1.68   0.093    -.0392956    .5091149
         L1.    -.0576644   .1423394    -0.41   0.685    -.3366445    .2213157
   mac_score  
              
  net_income     .0000269   .0000205     1.31   0.189    -.0000133    .0000671
assets_total    -.0000141   5.29e-06    -2.67   0.008    -.0000245   -3.73e-06
    firm_age     .0637165   .0806955     0.79   0.430    -.0944438    .2218767
crisis_dummy    -.1933734    .216165    -0.89   0.371    -.6170491    .2303023
              
         L2.    -.0093323   .0244588    -0.38   0.703    -.0572706     .038606
         L1.      .122766   .0358928     3.42   0.001     .0524175    .1931146
num_acquis~s  
                                                                              
num_acquis~s        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
One-step results
                                             Prob > chi2           =    0.0007
Number of instruments =     53               Wald chi2(8)          =     27.14
                                                               max =         4
                                                               avg =         4
                                             Obs per group:    min =         4
Time variable: year
Group variable: id                           Number of groups      =       211
Arellano-Bond dynamic panel-data estimation  Number of obs         =       844
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In the first part of the testing, I used the total number of acquisitions for the firm 
in a given year. The results show a marginal significance of the 2 year lagged reputation 
score in predicting num_acquisitons (p=0.093). However, as detailed before, there are 
more domestic acquisitions than international ones. Consequently, I decided to use the 
domestic acquisitions rather than the total number of acquisitions. In such case, the 
results are improved. The 2 year lagged effect of firm reputation is related and strongly 
significant (p=0.012) to the domestic acquisitions. As a result, domestic acquisitions are 
used as a proxy for knowledge and new technologies access for the rest of the dissertation 
and other analyses. The correlation matrix of the coefficients reports no apparent issues 
with high correlation between variables. Again, all the correlations are below 3.0 with the 
exception of firm_age and crisis_dummy, constant and firm_age, and constant and 
                                                                              
       _cons    -2.568375   4.700904    -0.55   0.585    -11.78198    6.645227
              
         L2.     .2533476   .1007159     2.52   0.012     .0559481    .4507471
         L1.     .1549137   .1018413     1.52   0.128    -.0446916     .354519
   mac_score  
              
  net_income     .0000148   .0000143     1.03   0.301    -.0000133    .0000429
assets_total    -.0000165   3.83e-06    -4.29   0.000     -.000024   -8.94e-06
    firm_age     .0451684   .0589822     0.77   0.444    -.0704346    .1607714
crisis_dummy    -.3053304   .1563433    -1.95   0.051    -.6117576    .0010968
              
         L2.    -.0876565   .0239069    -3.67   0.000    -.1345131   -.0407999
         L1.     .0233298   .0383126     0.61   0.543    -.0517614    .0984211
same_country  
                                                                              
same_country        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
One-step results
                                             Prob > chi2           =    0.0000
Number of instruments =     53               Wald chi2(8)          =     44.12
                                                               max =         4
                                                               avg =         4
                                             Obs per group:    min =         4
Time variable: year
Group variable: id                           Number of groups      =       211
Arellano-Bond dynamic panel-data estimation  Number of obs         =       844
       _cons    -0.1791   -0.2756   -0.7464   -0.9834    0.0955    0.0837   -0.2454   -0.1233 
L2.mac_score    -0.0675   -0.0817   -0.2207    0.0165   -0.0720   -0.0244   -0.1313    1.0000 
 L.mac_score    -0.0531    0.0041   -0.0533    0.1392   -0.0563    0.0028    1.0000           
  net_income    -0.0670    0.0357   -0.0546   -0.0711   -0.2683    1.0000                     
assets_total     0.1557    0.1641    0.0659   -0.1567    1.0000                               
    firm_age     0.1746    0.2725    0.7937    1.0000                                         
crisis_dummy     0.1760    0.1697    1.0000                                                   
L2.same_co~y     0.0641    1.0000                                                             
L.same_cou~y     1.0000                                                                       
                                                                                              
        e(V)   same_c~y  same_c~y  crisis~y  firm_age  assets~l  net_in~e  mac_sc~e  mac_sc~e 
                      L.       L2.                                                L.       L2.
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crisis_dummy. The VIF values assuming biased OLS results show that the values are less 
than 3.34 for the independent variable and less than 1.12 for the control variables. 
Accordingly, there are no major multicollinearity problems. Summarizing, results support 
hypothesis 4. 
Testing hypothesis 5. 
Hypothesis 5 suggests that the level of internationalization (DOI) of the firm 
interacts with the relationship between firm reputation scores and the number of 
employees such that for companies with higher level of DOI, the relationship is stronger. 
Thus, hypothesis 5 expects a positive interaction (multiplicative effect between reputation 
and DOI_MJAV). The proposed DOI measure takes into account the breadth and depth 
of internationalization as explained in Chapter II. Results are found in the following 
figure. Reputation scores, degree of internationalization and the multiplicative factor are 
assumed exogenous to the model as depicted in the conceptual model (see Chapter III). 
The control variables are assumed to be endogenous and the xtabond command utilizes 
instrumental variables in order to minimize the effect of endogeneity. For the hypotheses 
testing interaction effects, the variables were mean centered following Aiken and West 
(1991) recommendations. 
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Figure 15. Results for hypothesis 5. 
 
 
Results show that the multiplicative effects (lagged 1 and 2 years) are positive and 
strongly significant (p=0.001 and p=0.005) to the relationship between reputation and the 
number of employees. The direct effect of the reputation (2 year lagged mean centered) 
                                                                              
       _cons     106539.7   35100.05     3.04   0.002     37744.88    175334.6
              
         L2.     458.1833   164.4854     2.79   0.005     135.7978    780.5688
         L1.     508.9728     159.92     3.18   0.001     195.5353    822.4103
c_mac_scor~V  
              
         L2.    -162.6173   334.2207    -0.49   0.627    -817.6778    492.4433
         L1.      171.041   383.8036     0.45   0.656    -581.2003    923.2823
  c_DOI_MJAV  
              
         L2.     3451.545   892.6624     3.87   0.000     1701.958    5201.131
         L1.     1505.895   953.0171     1.58   0.114    -361.9846    3373.774
 c_mac_score  
              
  net_income    -.3722324   .1316988    -2.83   0.005    -.6303572   -.1141076
assets_total     .0684858   .0333251     2.06   0.040     .0031698    .1338017
    firm_age    -576.0043   460.7993    -1.25   0.211    -1479.154    327.1458
crisis_dummy    -2357.371   1284.151    -1.84   0.066     -4874.26    159.5178
              
         L2.    -.0727791   .0259703    -2.80   0.005    -.1236799   -.0218784
         L1.     .3179703   .0506854     6.27   0.000     .2186288    .4173118
   employees  
                                                                              
   employees        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
One-step results
                                             Prob > chi2           =    0.0000
Number of instruments =     57               Wald chi2(12)         =    116.52
                                                               max =         4
                                                               avg =         4
                                             Obs per group:    min =         4
Time variable: year
Group variable: id                           Number of groups      =       211
Arellano-Bond dynamic panel-data estimation  Number of obs         =       844
       _cons     0.0104    0.0159   -0.0425   -0.0328    1.0000 
L2.c_mac_s~V     0.0331   -0.1686   -0.1484    1.0000           
L.c_mac_sc~V    -0.0511    0.0116    1.0000                     
L2.c_DOI_M~V    -0.3980    1.0000                               
L.c_DOI_MJAV     1.0000                                         
                                                                
        e(V)   c_DOI_~V  c_DOI_~V  c_mac_~V  c_mac_~V     _cons 
                      L.       L2.        L.       L2.          
       _cons    -0.0151   -0.0261   -0.8315   -0.9930    0.1252    0.1276    0.0502   -0.0610 
L2.c_mac_s~V    -0.2215    0.0402    0.1355    0.0458    0.0834    0.0282   -0.0049    0.0399 
L.c_mac_sc~V     0.0699   -0.0598    0.0609    0.0383   -0.0603   -0.0763    0.0315    0.0005 
L2.c_DOI_M~V     0.0346    0.0037   -0.0348   -0.0162   -0.0419    0.0235    0.0005   -0.0381 
L.c_DOI_MJAV     0.0474    0.0138   -0.0035   -0.0231    0.0786   -0.0318   -0.0347   -0.0089 
L2.c_mac_s~e    -0.0613   -0.0040    0.0524    0.0720   -0.0497   -0.0147   -0.1640    1.0000 
L.c_mac_sc~e    -0.1018   -0.0101   -0.0339   -0.0345   -0.0215   -0.0012    1.0000           
  net_income    -0.1298    0.0973   -0.0730   -0.1039   -0.2608    1.0000                     
assets_total    -0.1074   -0.1167    0.0548   -0.1825    1.0000                               
    firm_age    -0.0649    0.0359    0.8215    1.0000                                         
crisis_dummy    -0.1389    0.0739    1.0000                                                   
L2.employees    -0.5275    1.0000                                                             
 L.employees     1.0000                                                                       
                                                                                              
        e(V)   employ~s  employ~s  crisis~y  firm_age  assets~l  net_in~e  c_mac_~e  c_mac_~e 
                      L.       L2.                                                L.       L2.
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remains positive and significant after including the interaction effect. However, the 
coefficients for the DOI_MJAV (lag 1 and lag2 mean centered) became insignificant 
(p=0.656 and p=0.627). In testing interactions, what really matters is the sign and 
significance of the interaction effect, which is positive as expected in the hypothesis. The 
correlation matrix of the coefficients seems acceptable. All the correlations are below 3.0 
except the lag 1 and 2 year for employees; it is logical that the number of employees from 
the previous year is correlated with the number of employees in time t+1. Firm_age and 
crisis_dummy are correlated, as well as constant and crisis_dummy, constant and 
firm_age, and lag2_c_DOI_MJAV and lag1_c_DOI_MJAV which is expected as firms 
do not radically change their degree of internationalization from one year to another. In 
summary, the results support hypothesis 5. The internationalization level of a firm, 
indeed, strengthens the relationship between corporate reputation and the number of 
employees. 
Testing hypothesis 6. 
Hypothesis 6 suggests that the degree of internationalization (DOI_MJAV) has a 
positive interaction effect on the relationship between corporate reputation and short and 
long term debt such that firms with higher levels of internationalization will show 
stronger relationships. Firm reputation, degree of internationalization, and the interaction 
effect are considered exogenous to the model and were mean centered before calculating 
the multiplicative term. The results are shown below. 
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Figure 16. Results for hypothesis 6. 
 
Results support hypothesis 6. The interaction effect is positive and strongly 
significant (p=0.000) for the model. Also, lag1 for reputation (mean centered) remains 
significant (p=0.035). Lag1 for the direct effect of DOI_MJAV (mean centered) is not 
significant (p=0.362); however, when testing interaction effects, the direction and 
significance of the multiplicative factor are the main objectives. Thus, firms with higher 
levels of internationalization may have better and more sources for financing their new 
product development or innovation projects as the interaction effect is positive and 
significant. 
Testing hypothesis 7. 
Hypothesis 7 argues that the degree of internationalization (DOI_MJAV) has an 
interaction effect on the relationship between corporate reputation and the number of 
acquisitions such that the relationship is stronger for firms with higher levels of 
                                                                              
       _cons     46606.04   13971.87     3.34   0.001     19221.69     73990.4
              
         L1.     555.6183   134.3012     4.14   0.000     292.3927    818.8439
c_mac_scor~V  
              
         L1.     248.0194   272.1129     0.91   0.362     -285.312    781.3508
  c_DOI_MJAV  
              
         L1.      1570.05    745.774     2.11   0.035     108.3599     3031.74
 c_mac_score  
              
  net_income    -.5567553     .09241    -6.02   0.000    -.7378757    -.375635
assets_total     .0266715   .0155993     1.71   0.087    -.0039026    .0572455
    firm_age    -534.7243   188.4904    -2.84   0.005    -904.1587   -165.2899
crisis_dummy    -358.0379    572.694    -0.63   0.532    -1480.498    764.4218
              
         L1.     .2546092   .0280764     9.07   0.000     .1995805    .3096379
         dlc  
                                                                              
         dlc        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
One-step results
                                             Prob > chi2           =    0.0000
Number of instruments =     58               Wald chi2(8)          =    155.52
                                                               max =         5
                                                               avg =         5
                                             Obs per group:    min =         5
Time variable: year
Group variable: id                           Number of groups      =       211
Arellano-Bond dynamic panel-data estimation  Number of obs         =      1055
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internationalization. In hypothesis 4, it has been shown that domestic acquisitions are 
used instead of the total number of acquisitions performed by the focal firm because US 
firms on average make more domestic and related acquisitions than the opposite. 
International experience measured by the degree of internationalization may influence the 
firms to engage in domestic acquisitions because they experienced the difficulties and 
costs of doing business abroad. Accordingly, we expect to find a positive coefficient for 
the multiplicative term in the dynamic linear panel data estimation. Direct factors were 
mean centered by year before calculating the multiplicative factor. 
Figure 17. Results for hypothesis 7. 
 
As expected, the coefficient for the interaction, or multiplicative, term is positive 
and significant (p=0.013). Also, the direction and significance for the direct effect of the 
lag2 for mean centered corporate reputation (c_mac_score) remains positive and 
significant (p=0.012). The mean centered variable for internationalization 
                                                                              
       _cons     1.841578   4.504188     0.41   0.683    -6.986469    10.66963
              
         L2.     .0476976   .0191693     2.49   0.013     .0101264    .0852688
c_mac_scor~V  
              
         L2.    -.0355091   .0379625    -0.94   0.350    -.1099141     .038896
  c_DOI_MJAV  
              
         L2.     .2651997   .1055553     2.51   0.012     .0583151    .4720844
 c_mac_score  
              
  net_income     .0000124   .0000143     0.87   0.386    -.0000156    .0000403
assets_total    -.0000151   3.86e-06    -3.90   0.000    -.0000227   -7.50e-06
    firm_age     .0182002   .0584167     0.31   0.755    -.0962945    .1326949
crisis_dummy    -.1832263   .1524223    -1.20   0.229    -.4819687     .115516
              
         L2.    -.0844322   .0242624    -3.48   0.001    -.1319857   -.0368788
         L1.      .026654   .0388935     0.69   0.493    -.0495759    .1028839
same_country  
                                                                              
same_country        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
One-step results
                                             Prob > chi2           =    0.0000
Number of instruments =     54               Wald chi2(9)          =     47.99
                                                               max =         4
                                                               avg =         4
                                             Obs per group:    min =         4
Time variable: year
Group variable: id                           Number of groups      =       211
Arellano-Bond dynamic panel-data estimation  Number of obs         =       844
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(c_DOI_MJAV) is not significant (p=0.350). However, Aiken and West (1991 pg. 11) 
attests that interaction (or moderating) effects are found when the coefficient for the 
multiplicative term is significant. The significances for the direct effects are not required 
to remain significant for concluding the presence of an interaction effect in the model. 
Therefore, results confirm and support hypothesis 7. 
Testing hypothesis 8. 
Hypothesis 8 argues that the distance of firms’ headquarters to top ranked 
universities measured in Euclidean distance has an interaction effect on the relationship 
between firm reputation and the number of employees. In other words, the closer the 
firms are to those educational institutions, the stronger the relationship between 
reputation and the number of employees. As the distance is measured by the total miles 
from the firms HQ to the universities, proximity is, then, the inverted (negative) of the 
number of miles which are found in the “totaldistance”. I then created the variables 
“c_minus_totaldistance” and “c_mac_scoreXc_minus_totaldist” to represent the 
closeness or proximity to the universities which was mean centered before calculating the 
multiplicative term. In this model, reputation scores, proximity to the universities, and the 
interaction effect are exogenous; the rest of variables are considered endogenous. 
“c_minus_totaldistance” in assumed to be invariant during the time span of the study as it 
is assumed that the top ranked universities in the fields of engineering, marketing, and 
entrepreneurship do not suffer radical changes in their positions within more or less 5 
years. However, the multiplicative effect is time variant. Results are depicted below. 
83 
Figure 18. Results for hypothesis 8. 
 
Results show that the lag2 for the reputation direct effect (mean centered) remains 
positive and significant (p=0.000) and the lag2 for the interaction effect is positive as 
expected, but not significant (p=0.246). The direct effect of c_minus_totaldistance is 
dropped from the analysis due to multicollinearity; as this variable is time invariant, 
xtabond procedure dropped it from the estimation. As a result, the hypothesis 8 is not 
supported. As a next step, I added the 2 interaction effects for the number of employees 
in the same model, i.e. the degree of internationalization and the proximity to 
universities. Results are shown next. 
                                                                              
       _cons     101434.6   35638.31     2.85   0.004     31584.81    171284.4
              
         L2.     .3908466   .3367662     1.16   0.246     -.269203    1.050896
         L1.    -.1173972   .3330187    -0.35   0.724    -.7701018    .5353074
c_mac_scor~t  
              
c_minus_to~e    (omitted)
              
         L2.     3346.363   897.1922     3.73   0.000     1587.899    5104.828
         L1.     1386.945   957.7572     1.45   0.148     -490.225    3264.114
 c_mac_score  
              
  net_income    -.3590245   .1321736    -2.72   0.007    -.6180799    -.099969
assets_total     .0474087   .0337099     1.41   0.160    -.0186614    .1134788
    firm_age    -492.1171   468.5754    -1.05   0.294    -1410.508    426.2737
crisis_dummy    -2876.189   1282.102    -2.24   0.025    -5389.063   -363.3141
              
         L2.    -.0672374   .0260696    -2.58   0.010    -.1183329   -.0161418
         L1.     .3312315   .0501717     6.60   0.000     .2328967    .4295663
   employees  
                                                                              
   employees        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
One-step results
                                             Prob > chi2           =    0.0000
Number of instruments =     55               Wald chi2(10)         =     87.08
                                                               max =         4
                                                               avg =         4
                                             Obs per group:    min =         4
Time variable: year
Group variable: id                           Number of groups      =       211
Arellano-Bond dynamic panel-data estimation  Number of obs         =       844
84 
Figure 19. Results for 2 interaction effects. 
 
Results remain robust with the inclusion of 2 interaction effects. The interaction 
effect for c_DOI_MJAV remains positive and significant (p=0.001 for lag1 and p=0.003 
for lag2) while the interaction effect for the proximity remains positive, but marginally 
significant (p=0.076 for lag2). Noticeably, the direct effect of corporate reputation (mean 
centered) remains strongly significant (p=0.000 for lag2) after the inclusion of 2 
interaction factors with their respective direct effects. The model is robust to different 
testing modifications. 
Testing hypothesis 9. 
Hypothesis 9 suggests that the number of employees (human capital for 
innovation) is positively related to the R&D expenses (innovation capability). In this 
                                                                              
       _cons     107072.9   35083.31     3.05   0.002     38310.84    175834.9
              
         L2.     .6032119   .3400972     1.77   0.076    -.0633664     1.26979
         L1.     .0505573   .3375764     0.15   0.881    -.6110803    .7121949
c_mac_scor~t  
              
         L2.     502.3404   166.8593     3.01   0.003     175.3023    829.3785
         L1.     525.2421   162.8448     3.23   0.001     206.0722     844.412
c_mac_scor~V  
              
c_minus_to~e    (omitted)
              
         L2.    -149.5807   333.9558    -0.45   0.654    -804.1221    504.9606
         L1.     177.7297   383.7317     0.46   0.643    -574.3706    929.8299
  c_DOI_MJAV  
              
         L2.     3418.287   893.5623     3.83   0.000     1666.937    5169.637
         L1.     1418.267   953.3416     1.49   0.137    -450.2481    3286.783
 c_mac_score  
              
  net_income    -.3801677   .1316096    -2.89   0.004    -.6381177   -.1222176
assets_total     .0718596   .0332937     2.16   0.031     .0066052    .1371139
    firm_age    -584.3621   460.6426    -1.27   0.205    -1487.205    318.4809
crisis_dummy    -2330.755   1283.742    -1.82   0.069    -4846.843    185.3332
              
         L2.    -.0711331   .0259586    -2.74   0.006     -.122011   -.0202553
         L1.     .3163674   .0506284     6.25   0.000     .2171376    .4155972
   employees  
                                                                              
   employees        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
One-step results
                                             Prob > chi2           =    0.0000
Number of instruments =     59               Wald chi2(14)         =    119.20
                                                               max =         4
                                                               avg =         4
                                             Obs per group:    min =         4
Time variable: year
Group variable: id                           Number of groups      =       211
Arellano-Bond dynamic panel-data estimation  Number of obs         =       844
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model, the predictors and control variables are assumed to be endogenous because the 
predictor (employees) is explained by the reputation score variable which is exogenous to 
the model. The results are shown below. 
Figure 20. Results for hypothesis 9. 
 
Results show that human capital is positively related to the R&D expenses in 
following years. In fact, employees at t-2 is significantly related (p=0.043) to the R&D 
expenses at time t; while employees at time t-1 is marginally significant (p=0.099). 
Although “employees” at time t is strongly significant, the interpretation is not functional 
other than the statistical meaning. The xtabond command provides the coefficient of the 
endogenous variable at time t and its lagged effects as default. Thus, results support 
hypothesis 9. One step further in the analysis of hypothesis 9 is to include the exogenous 
effect of firm reputation as a predictor; in other words, hypothesis 9 can test the 
mediating effect of employees on the relationship between reputation and R&D expenses; 
i.e. reputation predicting human capital (H2) predicting innovation capability. The results 
                                                                              
       _cons    -541.6235   1019.744    -0.53   0.595    -2540.284    1457.037
              
         L2.     .0026693   .0013208     2.02   0.043     .0000807     .005258
         L1.     .0027795   .0016869     1.65   0.099    -.0005268    .0060858
         --.     .0086376   .0020967     4.12   0.000      .004528    .0127471
   employees  
              
  net_income     .0028536    .003366     0.85   0.397    -.0037437     .009451
assets_total     .0014185   .0009628     1.47   0.141    -.0004685    .0033055
    firm_age     1.571994   13.34362     0.12   0.906    -24.58102      27.725
crisis_dummy    -41.11697   36.27886    -1.13   0.257    -112.2222    29.98828
              
         L2.    -.1035459   .0363756    -2.85   0.004    -.1748408    -.032251
         L1.    -.1654515   .0548027    -3.02   0.003    -.2728628   -.0580403
         xrd  
                                                                              
         xrd        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
One-step results
                                             Prob > chi2           =    0.0000
Number of instruments =     57               Wald chi2(9)          =     74.95
                                                               max =         4
                                                               avg =         4
                                             Obs per group:    min =         4
Time variable: year
Group variable: id                           Number of groups      =       211
Arellano-Bond dynamic panel-data estimation  Number of obs         =       844
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of this analysis are listed below. For this analysis, corporate reputation needs to be lagged 
at least one more period in the past and “employees” need to be lagged for only one 
period of time to represent causality. However, note that this procedure reduces the 
number of observations to 633 or 3 groups of 211 firms. Results show a fully mediating 
effect between corporate reputation, employees, and R&D expenses. Following Baron 
and Kenny (1986) and MacKinnon et al., (2002) studies, results show a significant 
relationship between corporate reputation and R&D expenses (see figure 21). There, lag2 
and lag3 of corporate reputation are significantly (p=0.017 and p=0.024, respectively) 
related to R&D expenses at time t. Then, hypothesis 2 confirmed the positive and strong 
relationship between corporate reputation and the number of employees. Finally, the 
results with both direct effects show a positive and significant relationship (p=0.045) 
between lag1 employees and R&D expenses at time t, and positive and marginal 
significance relationships (p=0.096 for lag2 and p=0.069 for lag3) between reputations 
scores and R&D expenses at time t. In other words, the relationship significance between 
reputation and R&D expenses is washed away when the number of employees is included 
as a mediating effect. These results confirm a fully mediating effect between reputation, 
employees, and R&D expenses. 
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Figure 21. Results for hypothesis 9 with mediating effect. 
 
 
Testing hypothesis 10. 
Hypothesis 10 argues that financial capital (short and long term debts) is 
positively related to innovation capability (R&D expenditure). As in the previous 
hypothesis testing, the predictor variables and control variables are considered to be 
                                                                              
       _cons     -1021.85   1763.131    -0.58   0.562    -4477.523    2433.824
              
         L3.     61.08583   27.15149     2.25   0.024     7.869893    114.3018
         L2.     65.37951   27.27075     2.40   0.017     11.92982    118.8292
   mac_score  
              
  net_income     .0092111   .0040295     2.29   0.022     .0013135    .0171087
assets_total     .0032921   .0012442     2.65   0.008     .0008535    .0057307
    firm_age      10.9234   22.23307     0.49   0.623    -32.65262    54.49942
crisis_dummy    -58.71301   45.23559    -1.30   0.194    -147.3731    29.94712
              
         L2.    -.1438752     .03896    -3.69   0.000    -.2202353   -.0675151
         L1.    -.0759948   .0636108    -1.19   0.232    -.2006696      .04868
         xrd  
                                                                              
         xrd        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
One-step results
                                             Prob > chi2           =    0.0000
Number of instruments =     45               Wald chi2(8)          =     52.71
                                                               max =         3
                                                               avg =         3
                                             Obs per group:    min =         3
Time variable: year
Group variable: id                           Number of groups      =       211
Arellano-Bond dynamic panel-data estimation  Number of obs         =       633
                                                                              
       _cons    -1215.395   1620.782    -0.75   0.453    -4392.069     1961.28
              
         L3.     49.02752   26.93612     1.82   0.069    -3.766301    101.8214
         L2.     45.97207   27.64901     1.66   0.096     -8.21898    100.1631
   mac_score  
              
         L1.     .0030539   .0015221     2.01   0.045     .0000707    .0060371
         --.     .0041085   .0022295     1.84   0.065    -.0002612    .0084782
   employees  
              
  net_income     .0054778   .0041309     1.33   0.185    -.0026186    .0135743
assets_total     .0027687   .0012124     2.28   0.022     .0003925    .0051449
    firm_age     8.834537   20.22415     0.44   0.662    -30.80407    48.47314
crisis_dummy    -55.54633   43.02667    -1.29   0.197    -139.8771     28.7844
              
         L2.    -.1493089   .0387964    -3.85   0.000    -.2253485   -.0732693
         L1.     -.109784   .0640429    -1.71   0.086    -.2353057    .0157378
         xrd  
                                                                              
         xrd        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
One-step results
                                             Prob > chi2           =    0.0000
Number of instruments =     54               Wald chi2(10)         =     62.85
                                                               max =         3
                                                               avg =         3
                                             Obs per group:    min =         3
Time variable: year
Group variable: id                           Number of groups      =       211
Arellano-Bond dynamic panel-data estimation  Number of obs         =       633
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endogenous in the model. If we recall hypothesis 3, firm reputation significantly 
predicted financial resources (“dlc”). Results for hypothesis 10 testing are shown below. 
Figure 22. Results for hypothesis 10 
 
Results marginally support hypothesis 10; lag2 for “dlc” is marginally related to 
R&D expenses at time t (p=0.084). As the relationship between financial resources and 
R&D expenses are marginally related, it is very unlikely the occurrence of the mediating 
effect of financial resources on the relationship between reputation and R&D expenses. 
One of the requirements for the mediation effect (Baron and Kenny, 1986) is that the 
mediator variable and the dependent variable need to be significantly related. 
Testing hypothesis 11. 
Hypothesis 11 suggests that the number of acquisitions (in the same country) is 
positively related to innovation capability (R&D expenses). Again, the predictor and 
control variables are assumed to be endogenous in this model because firm reputation 
predicted the number of domestic acquisitions in hypothesis 4. Results are shown below. 
                                                                              
       _cons    -135.2742   979.1664    -0.14   0.890    -2054.405    1783.857
              
         L2.     .0017155   .0009934     1.73   0.084    -.0002315    .0036626
         L1.     .0003609   .0009938     0.36   0.717     -.001587    .0023087
         --.     .0050519    .001473     3.43   0.001     .0021649    .0079389
         dlc  
              
  net_income     .0030047   .0031656     0.95   0.343    -.0031998    .0092092
assets_total     .0031275   .0009077     3.45   0.001     .0013484    .0049065
    firm_age     8.525502   12.87661     0.66   0.508    -16.71219     33.7632
crisis_dummy    -35.97557    34.6796    -1.04   0.300    -103.9463     31.9952
              
         L2.    -.0712446   .0352418    -2.02   0.043    -.1403173   -.0021719
         L1.    -.0711096   .0504988    -1.41   0.159    -.1700853    .0278662
         xrd  
                                                                              
         xrd        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
One-step results
                                             Prob > chi2           =    0.0000
Number of instruments =     59               Wald chi2(9)          =     40.84
                                                               max =         4
                                                               avg =         4
                                             Obs per group:    min =         4
Time variable: year
Group variable: id                           Number of groups      =       211
Arellano-Bond dynamic panel-data estimation  Number of obs         =       844
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Figure 23. Results for hypothesis 11 
 
Results show that hypothesis 11 is strongly supported. Lag1 and lag2 of domestic 
acquisitions predict the innovation capability (“xrd”) in year t (p=0.019 for lag1 and 
p=0.001 for lag2). Lag2 for domestic acquisitions shows a negative coefficient. This 
negative coefficient is balanced out with the stronger positive effect of lag1 of the same 
variable. Following the procedure explained in hypothesis 9, the mediating effect of 
domestic acquisitions on the relationship between firm reputation and innovation 
capability is tested. The exogenous predictor variable, i.e. firm reputation, needs to be 
lagged one more period of time in the past (i.e. t-3). As a result, there is a reduction in the 
number of observations to 633 or 3 groups of 211 each. 
Following Baron and Kenny's (1986) procedure to test mediating effects, first, the 
relationship between corporate reputation and innovation capability needs to be 
confirmed. Second, the relationship between reputation and domestic acquisitions was 
confirmed in hypothesis 4. Finally, both effects, i.e. reputation and domestic acquisitions 
                                                                              
       _cons     2039.376   1455.643     1.40   0.161    -813.6321    4892.383
              
         L2.    -49.89499   15.11015    -3.30   0.001    -79.51034   -20.27964
         L1.     53.93206   22.94741     2.35   0.019     8.955956    98.90816
         --.     105.0863   26.70369     3.94   0.000     52.74802    157.4245
same_country  
              
  net_income     .0041011   .0038036     1.08   0.281    -.0033538    .0115561
assets_total     .0034618   .0011494     3.01   0.003     .0012091    .0057146
    firm_age    -21.49886   18.55336    -1.16   0.247    -57.86278    14.86505
crisis_dummy    -39.95771   44.23011    -0.90   0.366    -126.6471    46.73171
              
         L2.    -.0959022   .0415461    -2.31   0.021     -.177331   -.0144734
         L1.     -.091742    .060155    -1.53   0.127    -.2096437    .0261596
         xrd  
                                                                              
         xrd        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
One-step results
                                             Prob > chi2           =    0.0000
Number of instruments =     57               Wald chi2(9)          =     49.48
                                                               max =         4
                                                               avg =         4
                                             Obs per group:    min =         4
Time variable: year
Group variable: id                           Number of groups      =       211
Arellano-Bond dynamic panel-data estimation  Number of obs         =       844
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need to be regressed on the innovation capability (“xrd”) to test for the mediation. Results 
are shown in figure 24. 
Figure 24. Results for hypothesis 11 with mediating effect. 
 
 
The results confirm a mediating effect of domestic acquisitions (lag2 of 
same_country, p=0.006) on the relationship between firm reputation (lag3 of mac_score, 
                                                                              
       _cons     -1021.85   1763.131    -0.58   0.562    -4477.523    2433.824
              
         L3.     61.08583   27.15149     2.25   0.024     7.869893    114.3018
         L2.     65.37951   27.27075     2.40   0.017     11.92982    118.8292
   mac_score  
              
  net_income     .0092111   .0040295     2.29   0.022     .0013135    .0171087
assets_total     .0032921   .0012442     2.65   0.008     .0008535    .0057307
    firm_age      10.9234   22.23307     0.49   0.623    -32.65262    54.49942
crisis_dummy    -58.71301   45.23559    -1.30   0.194    -147.3731    29.94712
              
         L2.    -.1438752     .03896    -3.69   0.000    -.2202353   -.0675151
         L1.    -.0759948   .0636108    -1.19   0.232    -.2006696      .04868
         xrd  
                                                                              
         xrd        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
One-step results
                                             Prob > chi2           =    0.0000
Number of instruments =     45               Wald chi2(8)          =     52.71
                                                               max =         3
                                                               avg =         3
                                             Obs per group:    min =         3
Time variable: year
Group variable: id                           Number of groups      =       211
Arellano-Bond dynamic panel-data estimation  Number of obs         =       633
                                                                              
       _cons      859.773   1985.034     0.43   0.665    -3030.822    4750.368
              
         L3.     77.53667   31.73946     2.44   0.015     15.32848    139.7449
   mac_score  
              
         L2.    -52.82983   19.37426    -2.73   0.006    -90.80269   -14.85698
         L1.     46.52981   27.20757     1.71   0.087    -6.796048    99.85566
         --.     87.89711   35.42136     2.48   0.013     18.47251    157.3217
same_country  
              
  net_income      .011831   .0047181     2.51   0.012     .0025836    .0210783
assets_total     .0034173   .0014857     2.30   0.021     .0005054    .0063292
    firm_age    -11.88352   25.28776    -0.47   0.638    -61.44661    37.67957
crisis_dummy    -34.49988   50.43163    -0.68   0.494    -133.3441    64.34429
              
         L2.    -.1533572   .0443354    -3.46   0.001     -.240253   -.0664614
         L1.    -.0693647   .0712118    -0.97   0.330    -.2089372    .0702078
         xrd  
                                                                              
         xrd        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
One-step results
                                             Prob > chi2           =    0.0000
Number of instruments =     50               Wald chi2(10)         =     56.46
                                                               max =         3
                                                               avg =         3
                                             Obs per group:    min =         3
Time variable: year
Group variable: id                           Number of groups      =       211
Arellano-Bond dynamic panel-data estimation  Number of obs         =       633
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p=0.015) and innovation capability (xrd at time t). In simpler terms, there is a mediating 
effect between lag3 (t-3) firm reputation, lag2 (t-2) number of domestic acquisitions, and 
the innovation capability (R&D expenses at time t); however, the coefficient is negative 
between lag2 domestic acquisitions and “xrd” at time t. 
Testing hypothesis 12. 
Hypothesis 12 is straight forward. It suggests a positive relationship between 
innovation capability (R&D expenses) and the performance of the firm (sales growth) 
(Teece, 1986). Basically, it tests whether firms can generate rents out of innovation. 
Predictor and control variables are assumed endogenous in the model. Results are 
reported in the following figure. 
Figure 25. Results for hypothesis 12. 
                                                                               
       _cons     .7329896   .4082256     1.80   0.073     -.067118    1.533097
              
         L2.    -.0001161   .0000437    -2.65   0.008    -.0002019   -.0000304
         L1.    -.0000163   .0000398    -0.41   0.682    -.0000942    .0000617
         --.    -.0001985   .0000381    -5.20   0.000    -.0002732   -.0001237
         xrd  
              
  net_income    -5.65e-07   1.86e-06    -0.30   0.761    -4.21e-06    3.08e-06
assets_total     4.47e-07   4.82e-07     0.93   0.353    -4.98e-07    1.39e-06
    firm_age    -.0055882   .0053974    -1.04   0.301    -.0161669    .0049905
crisis_dummy    -.0554362     .01645    -3.37   0.001    -.0876776   -.0231948
              
         L2.    -.2911526   .0394456    -7.38   0.000    -.3684645   -.2138406
         L1.    -.2991651   .0443589    -6.74   0.000    -.3861068   -.2122233
sales_growth  
                                                                              
sales_growth        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
One-step results
                                             Prob > chi2           =    0.0000
Number of instruments =     57               Wald chi2(9)          =    130.62
                                                               max =         4
                                                               avg =         4
                                             Obs per group:    min =         4
Time variable: year
Group variable: id                           Number of groups      =       211
Arellano-Bond dynamic panel-data estimation  Number of obs         =       844
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Results show that there is a significant relationship between R&D expenses 
(innovation capability in t-2) and firm performance (sales_growth) at time t. However, 
the direction of the coefficient is opposite to what it was expected. The coefficient is 
negative, but a weak negative coefficient. The 95% confidence interval shows that the 
coefficient for the lag2 of innovation capability is between -0.00020 and -0.00003; in 
other words, this coefficient is very close to zero. However, when the R&D expenses 
variable is lagged 3 periods of time the coefficient becomes strongly significant in the 
expected direction confirming hypothesis 12. More discussion about this phenomenon 
will be presented in the next chapter (Chapter VI). 
  
                                                                              
       _cons     .2426936   .6268596     0.39   0.699    -.9859286    1.471316
              
         L3.     .0003351   .0000911     3.68   0.000     .0001566    .0005135
         L2.     .0000847    .000056     1.51   0.130     -.000025    .0001944
         L1.    -.0000579   .0000535    -1.08   0.279    -.0001628    .0000469
         --.    -.0003164   .0000675    -4.68   0.000    -.0004487    -.000184
         xrd  
              
  net_income     1.50e-06   2.83e-06     0.53   0.596    -4.05e-06    7.05e-06
assets_total     3.21e-10   7.90e-07     0.00   1.000    -1.55e-06    1.55e-06
    firm_age    -.0022823   .0081481    -0.28   0.779    -.0182523    .0136876
crisis_dummy    -.0537101   .0200502    -2.68   0.007    -.0930078   -.0144124
              
         L1.      -.25219   .0546695    -4.61   0.000    -.3593403   -.1450397
sales_growth  
                                                                              
sales_growth        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
One-step results
                                             Prob > chi2           =    0.0000
Number of instruments =     46               Wald chi2(9)          =     74.14
                                                               max =         3
                                                               avg =         3
                                             Obs per group:    min =         3
Time variable: year
Group variable: id                           Number of groups      =       211
Arellano-Bond dynamic panel-data estimation  Number of obs         =       633
93 
CHAPTER VI 
DISCUSSION 
The dissertation studied principally the mediating effect of firm innovation 
capability on the relationship between firm reputation and performance in 211 US firms. 
Results confirmed the hypotheses in most of the cases; in others, surprising results were 
obtained from the Arellano-Bond dynamic linear panel data estimation methodology. 
This methodology is appropriate for analyzing hypotheses with a longitudinal panel 
dataset with multiple panels (firms) and few time periods (years). The structure of the 
dataset allows inferring causality between variables as periods of time are considered in 
the analyses (lagged effects of variables). 
The model for hypothesis 1 which is the main contribution of this dissertation has 
been fully supported. The mediating effect of innovation on the relationship between 
reputation and performance was confirmed by the results. The predictor variable is 
positively related to the mediating variable as expected; and, the mediating variable is 
positively and significantly related to the firm performance. Results are in line to my 
expectations in terms of direction and significance of the coefficients. The relationship 
between firm reputation and performance has been widely studied finding that a higher 
reputation is related to better firm performance. On a parallel research stream, innovation 
capability has been linked to better firm performance as well. However, the two research 
streams were not jointly analyzed; thus, this dissertation is the first study, at least to my 
knowledge, to consider both research streams together. The objective of the dissertation 
to confirm the mediating effect of innovation on the reputation-performance relationship 
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and combining both research streams were achieved. Hence, the contribution of this 
dissertation is evident and significant to the respective field of research. 
Robustness checks were performed using the alternative variables for each 
construct. For instance, in hypothesis 2, the reputation score (mac_score) was substituted 
by the reputation ranks: overall rank, rank following the fortune classification of 
industries, and the ranks following the SIC industry classification. The results showed 
that the overall rank and rank according to fortune classification are significant (p<0.01 
and p<0.05) for the lag2 effects. In the case for the rank according to the SIC codes, the 
lag2 shows marginal significance (p<0.10). As expected, all the coefficients are negative 
due to the “rank” nature. In other words, the greater the rank (first, second, third, etc) the 
worse the reputation score. These results provide information that the model for 
hypothesis 2 is robust. The reputation-human capital relationship remains with different 
variables. 
In hypothesis 3, “dlc” was changed by “dltt” (see chapter IV for variables 
descriptions). The relationship lag2 mac_score and dltt is positive and significant 
(p<0.05); i.e. similar to what it was found by using “dlc”. Thus, this hypothesis is also 
robust to tests using different variables. Also, the correlation matrix for the coefficients 
shows no major issues with multicollinearity. VIFs are low for the independent and 
control variables. 
Hypothesis 4 is one of the most robust to different checks. It has been previously 
argued that US firms tend, in average, to engage in domestic and related acquisitions. By 
changing the “same_country” for “sameSIC2”, the results are similar in terms of 
direction of the coefficient as well as the significance level. Also, the reputation measures 
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were changed to ranks and the results remained in the expected direction and with strong 
significance. For exemplification purposes, the relationship between “lag2 of rank_sic” 
and “sameSIC2” is -0.0074 (p=0.006); all the other possibilities are similar to this in 
terms of the direction and significance of the coefficients. “lag2 mac_score” and 
“num_acquistions” remains positive and marginally supported (0.2364; p=0.083) with the 
inclusion of two more variables: percentage of domestic firms and percentage of firms 
with the same SIC codes at 2-digit level. I can conclude from these robustness checks that 
the effects of US firms acquiring foreign firms is negligible; studies analyzing 
acquisitions transactions of US firms should consider domestic targets as opposed to the 
total number of acquisitions (foreign + domestic). 
In the robustness checks for hypothesis 5, 6, and 7 (moderating effects of 
DOI_MJAV), the degree of internationalization measure was changed to DOI_FSTS, i.e. 
a ratio of foreign sales to total sales. Results show that in the case of human capital, the 
interaction effect is marginally supported (p<0.10); in the case of the financial capital, the 
interaction effect is not significant; and, for the knowledge and new technologies access 
(acquisitions), the interaction effect is significant (p<0.05). Results vary by applying the 
DOI change. The proposed degree of internationalization (DOI_MJAV) provides better 
results than the DOI_FSTS. It has shown that the proposed measure is more complete as 
it addresses the breadth and depth of international operations as it considers not only the 
foreign sales to total sales (depth), but also the number of countries in which the firm 
operates and the foreign subsidiaries to total affiliates (breadth). The pairwise correlation 
between both measures is 0.5652 and is strongly significant (p<0.001 for 1477 
observations). The proposed DOI is, actually, measuring the same phenomenon as the 
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DOI_FSTS; the only difference is that the proposed DOI has more detail and variability 
in its calculations. For example, the DOI_FSTS ranges from 0 to 1 as it is a ratio; on the 
other hand, DOI_MJAV range from 0 to any positive real number; the limit will be the 
number of countries in the world; in other words, the upper limit would be around 200. 
The maximum possible number would be if a firm’s revenues are 100% in foreign 
markets, 100% of its subsidiaries are foreign, and the firm is located in all possible 
countries in the world. Therefore, the proposed DOI measure possesses more variability 
which results have shown a positive effect on the explanation of certain phenomena. It is 
recommended that more empirical research should be performed to confirm the better 
effects of this measure, contrasting with the FSTS measure. The other contribution of the 
dissertation is also important and significant for the research advancements. 
In hypotheses 9, 10, and 11 the innovation capability (R&D expenses) has been 
changed to the number of patents, R&D expenses per patent, and R&D expenses as a 
percentage of revenues. Similar results are obtained when the outcome variable is 
changed to the number of patents and R&D expenses per patent; however, the R&D 
expenses as a percentage of revenues (or sales) provides no significant results 
whatsoever. I can explain this circumstance because the R&D expenses to sales depend 
on the firm revenues as well as the sales growth for the firm. Literature has suggested 
using R&D expenses or patents as proxies for innovation capability; robustness checks 
confirm the conclusions made in the literature. R&D expenses per patent is a weaker 
proxy for the firm innovation capability; however, isolating some industries would 
enhance the properties of the “rd_patent” measure because there are industries in which 
patents are more required than in others. 
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Finally, hypothesis 12 provides surprising results. The expected sign for the 
relationship was positive; however, results show significant coefficient, but negative. I 
changed the R&D expenses to patents and the results show negative significant 
coefficient as well. However, patents and return on assets (ROA) provides positive 
results. R&D expenses and ROA provide positive results, but marginal. Something 
interesting and perhaps the explanation of these unexpected results is evident when I 
reduced the sample to only manufacturing companies, i.e. SIC codes from 2000 to 3999. 
The coefficient becomes positive and significant as expected and described in the 
literature. Firms in the manufacturing industry need more patents and invest more in 
R&D in order to remain profitable in the environment. As a result, these firms enjoy sales 
growth and/or higher returns on assets. The drawback for dividing the sample into 
manufacturing firms only is the reduction in the number of observations and firms. They 
went down to 78 firms with 312 observations, a trade-off that has to be analyzed closely 
in future research. Also, as shown in figure 25, I lagged the R&D expenses variable 
(“xrd”) by 3 years and results showed a positive and significant relationship to sales 
growth as expected and found in the literature. In other words, investments in R&D may 
be reflected after 3 years in terms of sales growth. This is not uncommon for 
manufacturing as well as service firms as they start enjoying the benefits of R&D 
investments after the second, or in this case after the third year. 
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CHAPTER VII 
CONCLUSIONS, LIMITATIONS, FUTURE RESEARCH, AND RELEVANCE FOR 
PRACTITIONERS 
The dissertation explores the mediating effect of innovation capability on the 
reputation-performance relationship. It makes an effort to integrate two research streams 
which remained independent in the literature. One stream of research studies the 
reputation-performance relationship; scholars argue that tangible as well as intangible 
assets, e.g. firm reputation, provide competitive advantage to the firm which can be 
translated in higher firm performance. Authors base their rationale in grounded theories 
such as the resource-based view of the firm (Barney, 1991; Rumelt, 1984;Wernerfelt, 
1984), and the institutional theory (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Hannan and Freeman, 
1984; Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978; Scott, 1994), among the most 
relevant. The second research stream studies the innovation-performance relationship. 
Scholars in the technology management and management in general stipulate that 
innovation is of extreme importance for the firm survival (Schumpeter, 1942; Teece, 
1986) and performance; firms can appropriate rents from innovation. Scholars in these 
two research streams have been dedicating their time and efforts to explain by conceptual 
and empirical studies the phenomena found in the business environment. However, the 
paths remained in parallel. It is with this dissertation that I am attempting to find a 
common ground for both research streams in which they can explain a specific 
phenomenon. The proposed model confirmed the mediating effect of innovation on the 
relationship between firm reputation and performance; these findings are validated for 
211 US firms in the time span of 7 years. The model is robust to different tests with 
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similar variables (robustness checks) providing very similar results. Causal inferences 
were possible because the sample structure, longitudinal panel data, allows it. 
In a different but related field, i.e. international business, this dissertation attempts 
to make a contribution as well. For many decades, an active debate on the relationship 
between multinationality and performance (M-P) in MNCs has called the attention of 
many scholars in the international business field. Researchers have found multiple forms 
for the M-P relationship, e.g. no relationship whatsoever, positive linear, negative linear, 
U-shape, inverted U-shape, sigmoidal, etc. These studies’ mix findings are attributable to 
a lack of convergence on the measure of the firm degree of internationalization (DOI). In 
the 90s, many scholars have proposed different techniques to measure DOI; however, 
consensus was not achieved. As a result, scholars are still contributing to the debate in 
finding better alternatives to measure DOI responding to the call from experts to 
contribute in the topic. In this dissertation, I propose a new measure for the firm DOI 
which takes into account the breadth and depth of the firm’s international operations. 
With this measure, I am not deviating too much from the most accepted type of measure, 
i.e. foreign sales as ratio of the total sales; in fact, the proposed DOI is build upon it 
providing more detail in the calculations and correcting for shortcomings found in the 
previous DOI measure. Results show that both measures are correlated; however, the 
proposed measure provides results which the other measure does not. This effect is 
attributable to the increased variation among the observations in the proposed DOI. 
Again, I attempt to contribute in the field of international business and more empirical 
research is needed in order to reinforce the acceptance of this new measure in the 
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literature. Research comparing and contrasting both measures would be of great 
importance. 
This dissertation is by no means without some limitations. It is a longitudinal 
panel data; however, the time window is 7 years only. Future research should increase the 
time span for more years to achieve statistical power in the estimations. Although the 
Arellano-Bond dynamic linear panel data estimators are designed for dataset with several 
panels with fewer time observations, more observations are always better. The 
dissertation relied only on data from US firms; future research might consider including 
firms from other countries, and perhaps firms from emerging economies in order to 
achieve greater generalizations. This dissertation used data from 211 firms in 8 
industries; future research may partition the sample in similar industries in order to 
achieve more detail per industry providing insightful conclusions for a specific industry. 
Finally, this dissertation relevance for practitioners is to provide some insightful 
information about the alternatives managers have to reap the benefits of high reputational 
position compared to their counterparts. Firm reputation can attract critical resources for 
new product developments (innovation) such as talented human capital and financial 
capital with better conditions; hence, the ultimate importance for managers to keep and/or 
improve the firm reputation. Firms need to innovate in order to secure their survival and 
growth in the environment. Firms are in the constant search for new knowledge and 
technologies for innovation; acquisitions are a good alternative when acquiring 
companies want more control and full access to the knowledge, technologies, and 
capabilities of the target organization. Strategic alliances or joint ventures may provide 
limited access to vital information, or technology to the partners. Results show that in 
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average US firms tend to acquire companies domestically and in related industries. 
Managers should be aware of the complexity of foreign and unrelated acquisitions. 
However, the risks are reduced as the firms “learn” the process of acquiring foreign and 
unrelated firms. Results in this dissertation suggest that firm reputation and innovation 
capabilities are strongly linked to firm performance; hence, managers need to have them 
as priorities in their strategic decisions. 
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